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Abstract 
The aim of this report is to present the within-country variability in the EU citizens’ perceptions of the generalised and 
institutional trust, quality of public service and local governance based on their experiences and opinions expressed in 
three surveys. By within-country variability we understand differences in citizens’ perceptions between cities or 
between (1) cities and (2) towns, suburbs and rural areas. We deal with the citizens’ opinions expressed in the surveys 
we used.  
The within-country variability in EU citizens’ perceptions of the trust, corruption, local governance and quality of public 
service and governance are investigated using several composites presenting the differences in citizens’ perceptions 
from three different perspectives and using three different data sets. First, with the European quality of life survey, we 
explore the level of (1) general trust, (2) institutional trust and (3) quality of public service in different with respect to 
degree of urbanisation areas in the EU countries. Second, with the Social Diagnosis survey, we examine the level of 
general trust and attitude towards free riding in 27 of the largest Polish cities. Finally, using data from the World 
Justice Project we investigate perceptions of law enforcement, generalised and institutional trust, corruption, bribing 
and performance of the local government in 58 of the largest EU cities. 
Our results showed that in general, there are differences in measured phenomena between EU countries, and 
especially within EU countries in relation to the degree of urbanisation and at city level. 
1 
Executive summary 
It is widely accepted that institutions contribute considerably to efficiency in implementation of 
public policies and, thus, to economic development. Institutions are defined as the rules of the game 
in a society, which govern the behaviour of individuals. Two types of institutions are distinguished: 
formal and informal. The former relate to the formal rules, which define social, economic, and 
political activities, e.g. property rights, rule of law with good governance included. The latter are 
associated with informal rules expressed in the form of social capital, i.e. in networks, trust and 
norms. 
Good governance is understood as ‘the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is 
exercised. This includes (a) the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; 
(b) the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and (c) 
the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions 
among them’ (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi 2010). As clearly stated in the EU 6th Report on 
Economic, Social and Territorial Cohesion: Investment for jobs and growth. Promoting development and good 
governance in EU regions and cities, good governance is the basis for institutional capacity building, 
creating trust and social capital (European Union 2014, p. 247). 
Trust contributes to forming positive, reciprocal ties with other people and increases the willingness 
of people to act in favour of the community. It is not only believed to be the main contributor in the 
process of building of social capital but in economic exchanges, by increasing predictability, stability, 
civic engagement and collective collaboration, it reduces transactions costs, facilitates cooperation 
with other people (information flow), creates confidence in the regulatory capacity of public 
institutions and contributes to the general feeling of community and belonging. 
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Although there has been a growing body of literature on the aforementioned phenomena, they are 
most often explored from a country-level comparative perspective (Baliamoune-Lutz 2011; Guiso, 
Sapienza, & Zingales 2008; Tsai, Laczko, & Bjørnskov 2010; Wang & Gordon 2011). The empirical 
evidence for regional differences is limited. 
Therefore, in this report we present the within-country variability in the EU citizens’ perceptions of 
trust, local governance, quality of public service, bribing and corruption,  based on their experiences 
and opinions expressed in three surveys. We want to clearly state that by within-country variability 
we understand differences in citizens’ perceptions between cities or between cities and towns, 
suburbs and rural areas. We stress that perceptions mean that we deal with citizens’ opinions 
expressed in the surveys we used. 
The within-country variability in EU citizens’ opinions about broadly understood institutions are 
investigated using several composites presenting the differences in citizens’ perceptions from three 
different perspectives and using three different data sets. First, with the European Quality of Life 
Survey, we explored the level of (1) generalised trust, (2) institutional trust, and (3) quality of public 
service in different with respect to degree of urbanisation areas in a number of EU countries. 
Second, with the Social Diagnosis survey, which we identified as the only one among country-
specific household surveys providing us with not only a city identifier but also with a sufficient 
sample size at city level, we examined the level of generalised trust and attitude to free riding in 27 of 
the largest Polish cities. Finally, using data from the World Justice Project we investigated 
perceptions of the levels of law enforcement, generalised and institutional trust, corruption, bribing 
and performance of local government in 58 of the largest EU cities. 
Our results showed that in respect to within-country variability according to the degree of 
urbanisation: 
3 
 
 there are differences with respect to the level of generalised trust both between countries 
and within countries. The highest level of generalised trust is recorded in the Nordic 
countries, whereas the lowest is in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries and 
Southern European countries. In addition, Slovakia, which scores the fourth worst is also the 
most diversified country with the difference of generalised trust score between cities and 
towns, suburbs and rural areas amounting to 1.1 points. It is followed by Portugal, Malta, 
Denmark, Austria and Greece with the difference in scores ranging between 0.5 and 0.7. The 
least diversified country with respect to generalised trust is France (0.05 points of difference 
between cities and towns, suburbs and rural areas); 
 with respect to within-country variability of institutional trust, in general the level of this 
phenomenon is not diversified (see also Figures 2-8). However, in Denmark, Austria, 
Hungary, Finland, Cyprus, Bulgaria and the Czech Republic the recorded differences are the 
highest and are always in favour of cities. The only exception to this reasoning is Bulgaria, 
where institutional trust is higher in towns, suburbs and rural areas than in cities. 
 with respect to within-country variability of the quality of public service, we observe that 
next to countries in which we observe almost no differences in the level of this phenomenon, 
there are also countries in which considerable differences with respect to the quality of 
public service are observed. France, the Netherlands, Ireland, Spain and Belgium all have 
cities that performed better in terms of public service than other areas. In Denmark and 
Bulgaria, the quality of public service is considerably better in towns, suburbs and rural areas. 
The analysis performed for Polish cities showed that: 
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 people living in Torun, Wroclaw and Ruda Slaska trust other people the most and habitants 
of Jaworzno trust other people the least (measured by the percentage of people who trust 
others). Warsaw and Cracow are among the highest scoring places. 
 the best scoring with respect to attitude towards free riding are: Opole, Warsaw, Katowice, 
Lublin and Poznan, all scoring at least 60.0 in the IFR. The worst scoring — below the 
country average of 47.27 — are: Wloclawek, Lodz, Olsztyn and Walbrzych. 
The analysis performed for 58 of the largest EU cities enabled us to distinguish four diverse groups 
of cities with respect to six independent criteria: Index of Law Enforcement (towards institutions 
and towards citizens), Generalised Trust, Index of Institutional Trust, Index of Corruption, Index of 
Paying Bribes and Index of Local Governance. We showed that the best scoring group comprises 
cities that on average score the best (in six out of seven analysed composites). This group comprises 
all Danish, Finish and Norwegian cities included in the analysis as well as one Estonian (Tartu), two 
Swedish (Goteborg and Stockholm) and two Hungarian (Budapest and Debrecen) cities. We also 
showed that the worst scoring group consists of cities that on average score the worst. This group 
comprises all Croatian and Slovenian cities, two out of three Bulgarian cities (Plovdiv and Sofia) and 
one Polish city (Cracow) included in the analysis. It is worth noting that none of the Romanian cities 
belong to this group. This is interesting because it is commonly found that Romania and Bulgaria are 
treated as countries that often perform similarly with respect to economic or social outcomes (see, 
e.g. Annoni, Weziak-Bialowolska, & Dijkstra 2012; Annoni & Weziak-Bialowolska 2014; Charron, 
Dijkstra, & Lapuente 2014a; Weziak-Bialowolska & Dijkstra 2014; Weziak-Bialowolska 2014). These 
results show that traditional diversification with respect to geographical location to Western, 
Northern, Southern and Western Europe is not necessarily correct while examining the institutions 
and local governance in city perspectives. Although the Western European and Northern European 
cities are well distinguishable and associated with the most favourable institutional conditions, cities 
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in the Southern and Eastern part of Europe cannot be classified unequivocally based only on the 
geographical location.  
From the methodological point of view, in all but one case, we confirmed the one-dimensional 
structure of the conceptualised composites. The remaining case relates to the law enforcement. 
Guided by the analysis of the correlation matrix and the principal component analysis, we proposed 
two composites — law enforcement from an institutional perspective and from the citizens’ 
perspective. In addition, the results of the series of uncertainty analyses show that in general, all 
composite indicators seem to be robust for the two normative assumptions related to the 
construction methods. This robustness is reflected by considerably narrow uncertainty intervals 
(difference between the 5th and 95th percentiles). 
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Data source Phenomena measured Level of 
measurement 
Main findings 
European Quality of Life 
Survey 
http://eurofound.europa.eu/surve
ys/eqls 
General trust — measured by the 
following question: 
Would you say that most people can 
be trusted?  
By degree of 
urbanisation: (1) big 
cities and (2) town, 
suburbs and rural 
areas 
There are differences with respect to the level of 
generalised trust both between countries and within 
countries. The highest level of generalised trust is 
recorded in the Nordic countries, whereas the lowest is in 
the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries and 
Southern European countries. In addition, Slovakia, 
which scores the fourth worst, is also the most diversified 
country with difference of the generalised trust score 
between cities and towns, suburbs and rural areas 
amounting to 1.1 points. It is followed by Portugal, Malta, 
Denmark, Austria and Greece with the difference in 
scores ranging between 0.5 and 0.7. The least diversified 
country with respect to the generalised trust is France 
(0.05 points of difference between cities and towns, 
suburbs and rural areas); 
European Quality of Life 
Survey 
http://eurofound.europa.eu
/surveys/eqls 
Institutional trust — measured by 
questions describing trust towards 
national parliament, legal system, press, 
police, government and local 
authorities 
By degree of 
urbanisation: (1) big 
cities and (2) town, 
suburbs and rural 
areas 
The level of institutional trust is not diversified, but in 
Denmark, Austria, Hungary and Finland, the recorded 
differences are the highest and are always in favour of 
cities 
European Quality of Life 
Survey 
http://eurofound.europa.eu/surve
ys/eqls 
Quality of public service — measured 
by questions describing quality of the 
following public service: health 
services, education system, public 
transport, child-care service, long-term 
care service, social or municipal 
housing, state pension system 
By degree of 
urbanisation: (1) big 
cities and (2) town, 
suburbs and rural 
areas 
The level of quality of public service in general is not 
diversified; however there are exceptions to this regularity; 
namely, the largest differences between the quality of 
public service are observed in Ireland and in Slovenia, 
where the quality of public service is better in towns, 
suburbs and rural areas 
Social Diagnosis 
http://www.diagnoza.com/i
ndex-en.html  
General trust — measured by the 
following question: 
Generally, do you believe that you can 
trust most people, or do you think you 
can never be too careful? 
27 of the largest 
Polish cities 
People living in Torun, Wroclaw and Ruda Slaska trust 
other people the most and habitants of Jaworzno trust 
other people the least (measured by the percentage of 
people who trust others). Among the highest scoring are 
Warsaw and Cracow. 
Social Diagnosis 
http://www.diagnoza.com/index
-en.html  
Attitude towards free riding — 
measured by questions describing how 
much people do not accept following 
27 of the largest 
Polish cities 
The best scoring with respect to the Index of Free Riding 
are: Opole, Warsaw, Katowice, Lublin and Poznan. The 
worst scoring — below the country average — are 
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free-riding activities: 
paying lower taxes than required, 
avoiding paying public transport fares, 
unjustly receiving unemployment 
benefit (i.e. when not entitled to it); 
unjustly receiving disability benefit; 
filing an insurance claim under false 
pretences; 
Wloclawek, Lodz, Olsztyn and Walbrzych. 
General Poll from the World 
Justice Project 
http://worldjusticeproject.or
g/questionnaires 
Law enforcement — institutions — 
measured by questions describing: the 
likelihood of stopping the president’s 
illegal actions by (1) 
the national congress and (2) courts; (3) 
the likelihood of stopping a 
government officer’s illegal and unfair 
decision by the judges; (4) the 
likelihood of sending to jail a police 
chief who is found taking money from 
a criminal organization, such as a drug 
cartel or an arms smuggler; and (5) the 
likelihood of sending to jail a 
government officer who is found 
unlawfully issuing a government license 
for personal benefit   
58 EU cities Four obtained city groupings are following. 
The best scoring group is group 3. It included cities that 
on average score the best (in six out of seven analysed 
composites). This group comprises all Danish, Finish and 
Norwegian cities included in the analysis as well as one 
Estonian (Tartu), two Swedish (Goteborg and Stockholm) 
and two Hungarian (Budapest and Debrecen) cities. 
Group 2 is on average the second best scoring group — it 
scores the second best in five out of seven analysed 
composites. However, this group scores the best with 
respect to the perception of bribing — next to group 3 
and the worst with respect to generalised trust. This group 
comprises all Belgian, German, Dutch, and British cities 
included in the analysis and two Finish (Tampere and 
Turku), two French (Lyon and Paris), one Italian (Milan), 
one Estonian (Tallinn) and one Swedish (Malmo) cities. 
The second worst scoring group is group 4. It scores the 
second worst with respect to four out of seven 
composites. However, this group is the best with respect 
to law enforcement towards its citizens, and the second 
best with respect to general trust. To this group belong all 
Czech, Greek, Portuguese, Romanian and Spanish cities 
included in the analysis, together with two Polish cities 
(Lodz and Warsaw), one Bulgarian (Varna), one French 
(Marseille) and two Italian (Rome and Naples) cities. 
Group 1 consists of cities that on average score the worst. 
This group comprises all Croatian and Slovenian cities, 
General Population Poll 
from the World Justice 
Project 
http://worldjusticeproject.org/que
stionnaires 
Law enforcement — citizens measured 
by questions describing: (1) the 
likelihood of prosecuting and 
convicting someone who commits a 
homicide in your neighbourhood; (2) 
the likelihood of business owners 
engaging in small operations of being 
fined if they operate a business without 
the required documentation and (3) the 
likelihood of business owners engaging 
in small operations of being fined if 
they do not register to pay taxes when 
they should.  
58 EU cities 
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General Population Poll 
from the World Justice 
Project 
http://worldjusticeproject.org/que
stionnaires 
General trust is measured using one 
question: How much trust do you have 
in people living in this country? 
58 EU cities two out of three Bulgarian cities (Plovdiv and Sofia) and 
one Polish city (Cracow) included in the analysis. Not one 
Romanian city belongs to this group. It is interesting 
because it is commonly found that Romanian and 
Bulgarian NUTS 1 or NUTS 2 regions and Romania and 
Bulgaria often perform similarly with respect to economic 
or social outcomes (see, for example, Annoni et al., 2012; 
Annoni & Weziak-Bialowolska, 2014; Charron et al., 
2013; Weziak-Bialowolska & Dijkstra, 2014; Weziak-
Bialowolska, 2014). 
 
 
General Population Poll 
from the World Justice 
Project 
http://worldjusticeproject.org/que
stionnaires 
Institutional trust is measured by 
questions describing trust towards (1) 
officers working in the local 
government; (2) officers working in the 
national government; (3) the police; 
and (4) the courts 
58 EU cities 
General Population Poll 
from the World Justice 
Project 
http://worldjusticeproject.or
g/questionnaires 
Perception of corruption is measured 
by questions related to the involvement 
in corrupt practices of: (1) the officers 
working in the national government; 
(2) the officers working in the local 
government; (3) members of 
parliament/congress; (4) judges and 
magistrates; and (5) the officers 
working in the police 
58 EU cities 
General Population Poll 
from the World Justice 
Project 
http://worldjusticeproject.or
g/questionnaires 
Perception of paying bribes is 
measured by questions related to the 
citizens’ opinion about the necessity of 
paying bribes or other inducements by 
people in the neighbourhood to: (1) 
register their ownership title for a piece 
of land or house; (2) obtain a driver’s 
license; (3) be admitted to a public 
school; (4) be treated in a public 
hospital; and (5) receive the services of 
the police; 
58 EU cities 
General Population Poll 
from the World Justice 
Project 
http://worldjusticeproject.or
g/questionnaires 
Local governance is measured using 
questions aiming at assessing the 
performance of the local government 
with respect to: (1) providing citizens 
information about the government 
expenditures; (2) consulting traditional, 
58 EU cities 
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civil, and community leaders before 
making decisions; (3) providing 
information in plain language about 
people’s legal rights, so that everybody 
can understand them; (4) providing 
effective ways to make complaints 
about public services; (5) providing 
effective ways to handle complaints 
against local government officials; and 
(6) responding to people’s concerns 
about community matters; 
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1. Introduction 
There is a recognised belief that countries with better institutions — both soft, such as trust and 
norms, and hard, such as rule of law and good governance — can expect better economic 
performance (Andrews, Jilke, & Van de Walle 2014; Baliamoune-Lutz 2011; Dinda 2008; Glaeser & 
Redlick 2009; Growiec & Growiec 2012; Hall & Ahmad 2013; Halleröd & Seldén 2012; Knack & 
Keefer 1997; Tabellini 2010; Torsvik 2000), lower crime rates (Blanco 2013), and greater voter 
turnout (Hug & Spörri 2011), among others. However, sub-national studies on the quality of 
institutions in the EU countries are considerably limited. The common focus is on countries’ 
performance and the comparability across countries. The only examples of analyses at the regional 
level we found are the following. With respect to formal institutions, Charron et al. (2014a; 2014b) 
showed that there is considerable within-country variability with respect to the European quality of 
governance. With respect to informal institutions, Tabellini (2010) presented that in Europe there 
are regional differences in the level of generalised trust. 
Therefore, the aim of this report is to address this gap by investigating the within-country variability 
in citizens’ perception of trust, corruption, local governance and quality of public service 
phenomena. We construct several composites presenting the within-country variability from three 
different perspectives and using three different data sets. First, with the European Quality of Life 
Survey, we explore the level of (1) general trust, (2) institutional trust and (3) quality of public service 
with respect to degree of urbanisation areas in different EU countries. Second, with the Social 
Diagnosis survey, we examine the level of general trust and attitude towards free-riding in 27 of the 
largest Polish cities. Finally, using data from the World Justice Project we investigate the levels of 
law enforcement, institutional trust, corruption bribing and performance of the local government in 
58 of the largest EU cities. 
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In the following sections, we first present the concepts being measured highlighting their 
associations with other economic and social phenomena (Section 2). Second, we devote two sections 
to present the data used (Section 3) and the methodology applied (Section 4), respectively. Third, in 
Section 5 using composites constructed based on the European Quality of Life Survey we present 
the level of trust and quality of public service in different countries with respect to the degree of 
urbanisation. The last section is devoted to presenting levels of trust and quality of institutions in a 
number of EU cities. 
2. Institutions 
North (1990) was the first who related institutions to economic performance. He defined them as 
‘the rules of the game in a society or, more formally’, which are ‘humanly devised constraints that 
shape human interactions’ (North, 1990, p. 3). Rodriguez-Pose (2013) stresses that this definition is 
not complete. It focuses on so-called formal or hard institutions, entirely neglecting informal/soft 
institutions. As examples of formal institutions Rodriguez-Pose (2013) enumerates constitution, 
laws, regulations, and the rule of law and property rights, among others. To informal institutions he 
includes culture, history, religion or identity, as well as social capital (Putnam, 1993), i.e. networks, 
norms, beliefs and trust. There is widespread agreement that formal institutions are believed to 
contribute to economic development (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson 2005; North 1990). 
However, as stressed by Rodriguez-Pose (2013), despite a general belief that informal institutions 
matter to economic development, quantitative studies find that the overall effects of informal 
institutions on economic activity and welfare tend to be negligible. Nevertheless, as pointed out by 
Rodriguez-Pose (2013, p. 1038), there is a strong belief that informal institutions, such as culture, 
history, religion or identity, play a non-trivial role on the potential of any territory to develop its 
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economic activity. Local and regional institutions promote development and growth by creating 
suitable conditions for investment, economic interaction and trade. 
 
2.1. General trust 
Robbins (2011) defines trust as confidence that people walking down the street will not steal from 
you or that if you leave your wallet on the ground, some anonymous person will return it. Bohnet 
(2008) claims that trust is the willingness to make oneself vulnerable to another person’s actions 
based on the perception of that person’s trustworthiness. Accordingly, generalised trust or social 
trust, which is one of the most recognised component of social capital, relates to a positive belief in 
the trustworthiness of most people. It goes beyond the boundaries of kinship, friendship and 
acquaintance (Tan & Tambyah 2010) and is a classic predictor of a prosperous and collectively 
vibrant country (Robbins 2011). 
Trust is believed to be the main contributor in the process of building up social capital (Fukuyama 
1995; Hall & Ahmad 2013; Knack & Keefer 1997; Knack 2002). It contributes to forming positive, 
reciprocal ties with other people, which increases the willingness of people to act in favour of the 
community (Fukuyama, 2001a, 2001b; Putnam, 1993). In economic exchanges, by increasing 
predictability, stability, civic engagement and collective collaboration, generalised trust reduces 
transactions costs (Bialowolska & Bialowolski, 2012; OECD, 2001; Putnam, 2000; Tsai, Laczko, & 
Bjørnskov, 2010). It also facilitates cooperation with other people (information flow), creates 
confidence in the regulatory capacity of public institutions, contributes to the general feeling of 
community and belonging (Dickes, Valentova, & Borsenberger 2009; Hall & Ahmad 2013) and leads 
to persistently higher levels of education (Halleröd & Seldén 2012). It is believed that determinants 
of trust comprise education (Knack 2002), legal property rights (Baliamoune-Lutz 2011; Knack & 
Keefer 1995; Robbins 2011), the rule of law (Fukuyama 2001a; OECD 2001; Robbins 2011), good 
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governance (Tsai et al. 2010), and corruption (Kotzian 2011; Letki 2006; Robbins 2011), which, in 
turn, contribute to the development of institutional quality. 
 
2.2. Trust in institutions 
Institutional trust is important for legitimising and stabilising social institutions (Kotzian 2011). It 
shows when citizens have positive expectations about members of such institutions and assume that 
they will follow procedures that will produce beneficial outcomes for themselves and for society at 
large (Askvik & Jamil 2013). Citizens grant and withhold trust based on their evaluation of the 
performance of the institution (Hakhverdian & Mayne 2012). 
It is not clear what comprises trust in institutions. For example, Beuningen and Schmeets (2012) 
distinguish social trust (which corresponds to generalised trust — a term used in this report), 
political trust and organisational trust. Political trust refers to political institutions and politicians. 
Organisational trust refers to trust in general institutions such as police, jurisprudence and the press. 
Bannister and Connolly (2011) distinguish trust in politicians and trust in the machinery of the state, 
i.e. the civil service, the government. Finally, Hakhverdian and Mayne (2012) distinguish between 
trust in domestic and international institutions. 
Operationalisation of institutional trust can be challenging. Kotzian (2011) claims that there are two 
components, comprised of the willingness of the person to trust and an institution being worthy of 
trust. He adds that in some countries, social trust can have a positive effect on institutional trust, 
whereas in others it will not have such an effect. It depends on trustworthiness of institutions in 
different countries. This, in turn, depends on the rule of law. In countries, in which it is necessary to 
bribe an official to obtain something, institutional trustworthiness is lower. 
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Andrews et al. (2014) investigated the relationship between institutional trust, economic strain and 
perception of social cohesion. They found that institutional trust has a statistically significant effect 
on public perceptions of social cohesion in Europe. They highlight that trust can moderate negative 
externalities for social cohesion associated with economic hardship. Ultimately, this implies that 
more should be done to understand and support the work that governments undertake to build 
confidence in the policies that they develop and implement. 
Marozzi (2012) claims that public institutions are trusted when they are seen to represent the 
interests and values of certain identity groups and when citizens are satisfied with the achievements 
of the institutions. He adds that social scientists should try to understand determinants of trust, 
which is perceived as a central element to social order and survival of any democratic regime: it 
affects institutional performance, well-being, economic development and crime reduction. 
2.3. Quality of governance 
The quality of government — with the government effectiveness included — has been found to 
lead to better economic performance (Knack & Keefer 1995; Mauro 1995), lower income inequality 
and poverty (d’Hombres, Elia, & Weber, 2013) and higher levels of subjective happiness (Frey & 
Stutzer 2002). Additionally, Letki (2006) claims that an institutional dimension, both in the form of 
individuals’ perceptions as well as the quality of governance, i.e. confidence in political institutions 
and their objective quality, are the strongest predictors of civic morality, which she defines as the 
attitude towards free-riding. 
The nature of the relationship between the quality of governance (i.e. the government effectiveness) 
and generalised trust has been investigated. It has been found that in general, trust affects the quality 
of institutions, thus, the quality of governance in numerous ways. First, trustworthy society, 
politicians and government officials are likely to be truthful and thus less likely to take advantage of 
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their positions for personal benefit (Bjørnskov & Méon 2013; Boix & Posner 1998; Knack & Keefer 
1997; Knack 2002). Second, trust facilitates cooperation and compromises between government 
bureaucrats (Boix & Posner 1998) as well as adoption of institutional reforms (Knack 2002). Third, 
trust contributes to solving the principal agent problem, which is observed in the relationship 
between government and public agencies (Boix & Posner 1998). 
Recently, the bidirectional version of a causal relationship between general trust and the quality of 
institutions was tested by Robbins (2011). Her results show that generalised trust and institutional 
quality form a positive reciprocal relationship, in which the connection is stronger from generalised 
trust to institutional quality. 
3. Data 
One of the aims of this project was to explore the possibility of investigating citizens’ perception of 
the quality of the institutions and good governance in European cities. In our search we explored 
both household surveys and pool surveys for data. Our aim was also to find a data source that would 
provide information on a regular basis. 
With respect to household surveys, our first choice was the European Union Survey on Income and 
Living Conditions (EU-SILC). Although this survey comprises a lot of questions, those that refer to 
institutions are limited. In 2013, an ad-hoc model on well-being complemented the main EU-SILC 
questionnaire. Nevertheless, the survey does not provide information enabling computations at the 
city level. Therefore, we also explore the country-specific household surveys dealing with aspects of 
institutions and quality of life. We have investigated the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), 
the British Household Panel Survey/Understanding Society, the Italian Survey on Household and 
Income, the French Household Wealth Survey and the Polish Social Diagnosis. Among these, only 
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the British, German and Polish surveys comprise questions on institutions and quality of life, 
whereas the remaining two concentrate on income and wealth issues. Only the Social Diagnosis 
provided us with a city identifier and a sufficient sample size at the city level. Therefore in the 
following sections, we present the situation in Polish cities with respect to perceptions of 
institutions, generalised trust and attitude towards free-riding. 
Among investigated non-household surveys we found as very interesting to our purposes following: 
1. the Quality of Life in cities. Perception survey in 79 European cities. Flash Eurobarometer 
366 (European Union 2013) 
2. the Quality of Governance data set (Charron et al. 2014a) 
3. Public Opinion in the European Union Regions. Flash Eurobarometer 356 (EC 2012) 
4. the General Population Poll used in the World Justice Project to construct the Rule of Law 
Index (The World Justice Project 2014). 
Although all these data sources comprise comprehensive information on quality of governance, only 
the first and the last ones enable us to look at the city level. The remaining two refer to NUTS 2 
regions. The first data source seems to be very well explored (see European Union 2013), contrary 
to the last one. Although the data in the General Population Poll used in the World Justice Project 
are collected using probability samples drawn from the three largest cities in each country in a way 
that ensures representativeness (with respect to basic demographic features) of population in these 
cities, the results, i.e. the Rule of Law Index is presented only at the country level. Therefore, in our 
project we concentrated on this data source and we used it to present EU citizens’ perceptions of 
quality of governance in European cities. 
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4. Methods 
The aim of this report is to investigate the within-country variability in the citizens’ perception of 
local governance, quality of public service, trust and corruption. Most of these phenomena are of a 
complex nature, which implies that they comprise several dimensions. Therefore, in order to 
comprehensively capture their essence, we used composite indicators, i.e. instruments that aggregate 
individual variables with the aim of capturing the substance of the relevant phenomenon. These 
measures are often used in the field of economics or social sciences to monitor initiatives in a variety 
of policy domains such as industrial competitiveness, sustainable development, quality of life 
assessment, globalisation, innovation or academic performance (Munda, Nardo, Saisana, & 
Srebotnjak 2009) and to answer a practical need to rate individuals, regions, and countries, etc. 
(Paruolo, Saisana, & Saltelli 2013). 
To construct composite indicators, we use a series of statistical techniques to ensure their statistical 
soundness. First, we check our data with respect to coverage. It appears that the data we use are 
complete, implying that there are not any missing observations and no imputation procedure is 
required. Second, we analyse indicators with respect to lack of non-normal distribution and lack of 
outliers. We verify if the values of each indicator fulfil the two following criteria: skewness < 2 and 
kurtosis < 3.5 (Dybczyński 1980; Velasco & Verma 1998). Third, we investigate if, provided that 
data are normalised with the orientation of indicators taken into consideration, all correlation 
coefficients are positive (at least when statistically significant). Positive correlations imply that all 
indicators point in the same direction, which is generally desirable when developing a composite 
indicator. Instead, negative correlations between indicators are problematic. They signal either the 
presence of trade-offs between the indicators or a conceptual inconsistency (if not a coding or a 
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calculation error). Fourth, we verify if the correlation between an indicator and the composite is not 
very low or random, which may imply that indicators may not capture the same aspect as the 
remaining, more correlated indicators. 
Next, we verify if all indicators contribute significantly to the variance of their aggregates and 
whether a single measure is enough to summarize the indicators that are conceptually grouped in the 
same composite. As we believe that a composite is probably formative rather than reflective in 
nature (see the excellent discussion on the reflective and formative indices provided in Bagozzi, 
2007), applying the principal component analysis (PCA) is recommended. We expect a one-
dimensional solution from the PCA. Therefore, our criteria for component extraction are based on 
the Keiser-Mayer-Olkin statistic (KMO), which is expected to be above 0.5 (Antony & Visweswara 
Rao 2007; Wu 2007); the Keiser criterion (i.e. only one eigenvalue above 1); the amount of variance 
explained (min. 50 %) and the pattern of principal component loadings (i.e. all of the same sign and 
of similar value). Additionally, we analysed the communalities, which informs how much of the 
variance in each of the original variables is explained by the extracted principal component. We 
expected it to be above 0.5, which implies that a principal component comprises at least 50 % of the 
variance in the original variable. 
Having confirmed one-dimensionality of the concept, in the following step, we aggregate variables 
into a composite indicator. As our composites generally consist of variables belonging to the same 
battery of questions, implying that they refer to various aspects but are of the same phenomena, we 
use an arithmetic average with equal weights. This method ensures full compensation of low results 
in one variable with high results in others, but this is desirable and follows the common practice 
according to which variables at the lowest level of the framework of the composite — i.e. populating 
the dimensions — are aggregated using an arithmetic average and then, at the higher levels of the 
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structure other types of the generalised mean are used (see for example Composite Indicators of 
Research Excellence by Vertesy and Tarantola (2012)). 
Then, we expect a composite to be statistically well balanced, implying that the importance of 
indicators in a composite indicator is relatively equal, or nominal weights attributed to the indicators 
should correspond to their importance to a composite. By the importance of indicators we 
understand their contribution to the variance of the scores of a composite indicator. Therefore, to 
verify if a composite is statistically well balanced, we calculate the correlation coefficients between 
the variables and a composite. This coefficient, when squared and rescaled to unity sum, can serve as 
a proxy for the variable importance (Paruolo et al. 2013). 
Finally, to assess the robustness of the composite with regard to the normative assumptions related 
to the aggregation method (and the level of compensability) and importance of variables, which is 
made during the conceptualisation step, we perform uncertainty analysis. The aim of this analysis is 
to measure the overall variation in composite scores and ranks resulting from the uncertainty linked 
to the assumptions made. To verify the assumption on compensability, we modify the aggregation 
method, i.e. the arithmetic average, which is also a generalised mean of power 1. We assumed that 
the power of the generalised mean can vary between 0 (geometric average) and 2. In particular, in 
the uncertainty analysis, its values are sampled from the uniform distribution U[0; 2]. The second 
assumption on equal weighting is tested by assuming weights associated to six variables to range 
about ± 10 % of the reference weight. The two uncertain factors, namely the power of the 
generalised mean and the weights, are sampled simultaneously in a quasi-random sampling scheme 
(Sobol’ 1967) with a sample of n= 3,000 in order to capture all possible interaction effects among 
the assumptions made. Thanks to this, through a procedure being a combination of a Monte Carlo 
experiment and a multi-modelling approach, the final scores and ranks are presented with 
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uncertainty expressed by the error terms (5th and 95th percentiles) and compared to the median 
simulated scores and ranks, respectively. 
All the indexes are presented for relevant sub-national entities, i.e. cities or by densely populated and 
intermediate density and thinly populated areas within the countries. They are always complemented 
by composite indicator scores computed at the country level. It is worth noting that country 
averages and EU-averages (if presented) are always calculated as the weighted population averages 
using all the sampled data. 
 
 
5. Trust and quality of public service by degree of urbanisation 
5.1. European Quality of Life Survey 2012 
We identified only one survey that provides both comprehensive information on broadly 
understood formal institutions and aspects of good governance and enables inter-country 
comparability of these phenomena in Europe at the sub-national — defined by degree of 
urbanisation (1) — level. This is the European Quality of Life Survey (EQLS) (2), (3). The aim of the 
EQLS is to provide comparable and reliable data on the quality of life across Europe. The survey 
was conducted in the 27 EU Member States and 7 non-EU countries (Croatia, Iceland, Kosovo, the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey). The target population 
was all residents of the countries mentioned above, aged 18 or older who are interviewed through a 
                                                        
(1) The degree of urbanisation (DEGURBA) creates a classification of all LAU2s (Local Administrative Units — Level 2/municipalities) into the 
following three categories: (1) Cities, (2) Towns and suburbs, (3) Rural areas. More information can be found at:  
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ramon/miscellaneous/index.cfm?TargetUrl=DSP_DEGURBA or in Dijkstra and Poelman (2014) 
(2) http://eurofound.europa.eu/surveys/eqls 
(3) We explored also the European Union Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) with respect to measuring institutions. Although 
the EU-SILC enables analysis by the degree of urbanisation, we found out that in the main data set such information is limited. Nevertheless, in 
2013 an ad-hoc model on well-being complemented the main EU-SILC questionnaire. Because the individual data are not still available, this 
data source was not used in the project. 
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face-to-face interview conducted in people’s homes in the national language(s) of the country. 
Provided that the weights are used, the survey is representative at the country level in terms of 
gender, age, urbanisation level, region and household size. The target sample size ranges from 1,000 
in the smaller countries to 3,000 in the biggest. Upon completion of the fieldwork, the total number 
of interviews was 43,636. 
Based  on data from the EQLS we propose three measures related to the following phenomena: 
 general trust 
 institutional trust (institutional confidence) 
 quality of public service. 
General trust is measured with a single question. Institutional trust and quality of public service are 
measured with composite indicators (CI) computed as the arithmetic means with equal weighting. 
The sample sizes per country and the number of ‘don’t know’ answers as well as refusals to answer 
for each analysed question are presented in the Appendix in Table A1. We also recall that all country 
and the EU-28 averages are computed using all sampled data with application of the proper weights. 
 
5.2. General trust 
General trust is measured using data from the question: Would you say that most people can be 
trusted? (on a scale from 1 to 10) (Y11_Q24). The level of general trust in European countries with 
respect to degree of urbanisation (we distinguish (1) big cities and (2) town, suburbs and rural areas) 
measured as a country arithmetic average of the responses, with answers ‘don’t know’ and refusals 
treated as missing values, is presented in Figure 1 and Table 1 (4). 
                                                        
(4) Degurba for Lithuania is not available. 
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There are differences with respect to the level of generalised trust both between countries and 
within countries. The highest level of generalised trust is recorded in the Nordic countries, whereas 
the lowest is in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries and Southern European 
countries. In addition, Slovakia, which scores the fourth worst, is also the most diversified country 
with the difference of the generalised trust score between cities and towns, suburbs and rural areas 
amounting to 1.1 points. It is followed by Portugal, Malta, Denmark, Austria and Greece, with the 
difference in scores ranging between 0.5 and 0.7. The least diversified country with respect to the 
generalised trust is France (0.05 points of difference between cities and towns, suburbs and rural 
areas). 
 
Figure 1. Level of general trust in European (1) countries, (2) cities, and (3) towns, suburbs and rural areas — 
sorted according to the differences between (2) cities, and (3) towns, suburbs and rural areas with worse city 
performance on the left end and better city performance on the right. 
Source: own computations based on the European Quality of Life Survey 2012 
 
 
Table 1. Level of general trust in European countries, cities, towns, suburbs and rural areas 
Country Cities Towns, suburbs and rural areas Country EU-28 
AT 5.75 5.13 5.25 5.01 
BE 5.32 5.52 5.46 5.01 
BG 4.79 4.53 4.56 5.01 
CY 2.12 1.76 1.95 5.01 
CZ 4.10 3.99 4.02 5.01 
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DE 4.95 5.08 5.03 5.01 
DK 7.42 6.77 6.97 5.01 
EE 4.64 4.88 4.78 5.01 
ES 5.59 5.31 5.45 5.01 
FI 7.42 6.98 7.18 5.01 
FR 5.36 5.31 5.34 5.01 
GR 4.16 4.75 4.43 5.01 
HR 4.75 4.56 4.62 5.01 
HU 4.47 4.29 4.33 5.01 
IE 5.32 5.46 5.35 5.01 
IS 6.34 6.11 6.26 5.01 
IT 4.92 4.78 4.83 5.01 
LU 5.60 5.94 5.88 5.01 
LV 3.95 4.22 4.12 5.01 
MT 5.00 4.34 4.68 5.01 
NL 6.16 6.36 6.27 5.01 
PL 4.64 4.86 4.79 5.01 
PT 4.60 3.91 4.33 5.01 
RO 5.06 4.94 5.00 5.01 
SE 6.50 6.37 6.42 5.01 
SI 5.28 5.18 5.20 5.01 
SK 5.10 4.00 4.19 5.01 
UK 5.31 5.67 5.47 5.01 
Source: own computations based on the European Quality of Life Survey 2012 
 
 
The level of generalised trust in Cyprus, despite being not very diversified with respect to within-
country variability, stands out. We find this result quite surprising. However, our effort to verify it by 
comparing our results with the results of other scholars and/or using different data source did not 
give us unequivocal conclusions. According to the based on the World Value Survey (WVS) by 
Delhey et al. (2011), Cyprus is the lowest scoring EU country. The percentage of people who trust in 
most people is there at a level of about 10 %, while in the second worst EU countries — Slovenia, 
France and Poland — it accounts for almost 20 %. It is also worth mentioning that according to this 
study the best scoring with this respect are Norway and Sweden with the percentage of those who 
trust at the level of about 70 %. It shows that, although Cyprus scores the worst, it does not stand 
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out as much as in our study. This finding was confirmed by us. Using the European Social Survey 
(ESS) wave 2012, we calculated the average level of trust in people. The results — despite correlated 
at the level of 0.82 — do not support the distinctive position of the Cyprus in terms of generalised 
trust. Although Cyprus scores the second worst (3.646), following Bulgaria (3.347), its score is only 
slightly worse than that of Portugal (3.649). Additionally, in the study based on the European Social 
Survey 2002-2010 by Olivera (2013), Cyprus does not stand out and does not score the worst. 
However, it must be noted that there are considerable methodological differences between the WVS 
and the ESS in the way of asking about the level of generalised trust. In the WVS, respondents are 
asked if most people can be trusted, while in the ESS they are asked to assess on the 11-point scale 
how much most people can be trusted. These differences may bring about substantial differences in 
the results. Nevertheless, in European Quality of Life Survey (EQLS), used by us, the way of asking 
about the generalised trust resembles those used in the ESS. With this in regard, we find very 
difficult to explain the results we obtain. 
 
5.3. Trust in institutions 
Trust in institutions is measured using data from six questions (measured on a scale from 1 — do 
not trust at all to 10 — trust completely) presented in Table 2. The questions describe trust towards 
national parliament, legal system, press, police, government, and local authorities. 
 
Table 2. Questions measuring institutional trust 
Label Question 
Trust in institutions 
Q28a   [Nationality] parliament/How much you personally trust each of the following 
institutions 
Q28b  The legal system/How much you personally trust each of the following institutions 
Q28c  The press/How much you personally trust each of the following institutions 
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Q28d The police/How much you personally trust each of the following institutions 
Q28e The government/How much you personally trust each of the following institutions 
Q28f The local (municipal) authorities/How much you personally trust each of the following 
institutions 
 
The level of trust towards each institution in each of the analysed country with respect to country 
level as well as cities and towns, suburbs and rural areas is presented in Figure 2 — Figure 7 and in 
Table 3. 
 
 
Figure 2. Trust in the national parliament in European (1) countries, (2) cities, and (3) towns, suburbs and 
rural areas — sorted according to the differences between (2) cities, and (3) towns, suburbs and rural areas 
with worse city performance on the left end and better city performance on the right. 
Source: own computations based on the European Quality of Life Survey 2012. 
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Figure 3. Trust in the legal system in European (1) countries, (2) cities, and (3) towns, suburbs and rural areas 
— sorted according to the differences between (2) cities, and (3) towns, suburbs and rural areas with worse 
city performance on the left end and better city performance on the right. 
Source: own computations based on the European Quality of Life Survey 2012. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Trust in the press in European (1) countries, (2) cities, and (3) towns, suburbs and rural areas — 
sorted according to the differences between (2) cities, and (3) towns, suburbs and rural areas with worse city 
performance on the left end and better city performance on the right. 
Source: own computations based on the European Quality of Life Survey 2012. 
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Figure 5. Trust in the police in European (1) countries, (2) cities, and (3) towns, suburbs and rural areas — 
sorted according to the differences between (2) cities, and (3) towns, suburbs and rural areas with worse city 
performance on the left end and better city performance on the right. 
Source: own computations based on the European Quality of Life Survey 2012. 
 
 
Figure 6. Trust in the government in European (1) countries, (2) cities, and (3) towns, suburbs and rural areas 
— sorted according to the differences between (2) cities, and (3) towns, suburbs and rural areas with worse 
city performance on the left end and better city performance on the right. 
Source: own computations based on the European Quality of Life Survey 2012. 
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Figure 7. Trust in the local (municipal) authorities in European (1) countries, (2) cities, and (3) towns, suburbs 
and rural areas — sorted according to the differences between (2) cities, and (3) towns, suburbs and rural 
areas with worse city performance on the left end and better city performance on the right. 
Source: own computations based on the European Quality of Life Survey 2012. 
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Table 3. Level of trust in institutions in European countries with respect to cities and towns, suburbs and rural areas. 
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Trust in the national parliament Trust in the legal system Trust in the press 
AT 5.60 4.80 4.95 4.07 6.81 5.70 5.91 4.81 5.28 4.93 5.00 4.41 
BE 4.84 4.37 4.50 4.07 4.94 4.83 4.86 4.81 4.80 5.12 5.03 4.41 
BG 2.94 3.06 3.04 4.07 2.64 2.89 2.86 4.81 3.24 3.84 3.77 4.41 
CY 3.55 3.37 3.47 4.07 4.40 3.87 4.15 4.81 4.34 4.04 4.20 4.41 
CZ 3.61 3.15 3.28 4.07 4.67 4.06 4.23 4.81 5.03 4.73 4.81 4.41 
DE 5.19 5.23 5.21 4.07 5.85 6.01 5.95 4.81 4.93 5.10 5.03 4.41 
DK 6.88 5.80 6.12 4.07 8.34 7.83 7.98 4.81 4.98 5.09 5.06 4.41 
EE 4.18 4.48 4.35 4.07 5.24 5.08 5.14 4.81 4.63 4.76 4.70 4.41 
ES 4.11 4.25 4.18 4.07 4.53 4.42 4.48 4.81 4.54 4.52 4.53 4.41 
FI 6.18 5.56 5.84 4.07 7.31 6.84 7.05 4.81 5.54 5.25 5.38 4.41 
FR 4.72 4.19 4.49 4.07 5.05 4.65 4.88 4.81 4.58 4.39 4.50 4.41 
GR 2.20 2.41 2.30 4.07 2.98 3.19 3.07 4.81 2.66 2.88 2.76 4.41 
HR 3.02 2.95 2.97 4.07 3.21 3.18 3.19 4.81 3.43 3.58 3.53 4.41 
HU 3.84 3.42 3.52 4.07 4.60 4.01 4.16 4.81 3.50 3.36 3.40 4.41 
IE 3.73 3.91 3.77 4.07 5.00 4.79 4.96 4.81 3.73 3.53 3.68 4.41 
IS 4.11 4.20 4.14 4.07 6.07 5.94 6.03 4.81 4.82 4.67 4.77 4.41 
IT 3.03 3.12 3.09 4.07 3.95 3.94 3.94 4.81 4.29 4.23 4.25 4.41 
LU 6.15 5.74 5.81 4.07 6.60 6.15 6.22 4.81 5.17 5.41 5.36 4.41 
LV 2.82 2.63 2.70 4.07 4.04 3.88 3.94 4.81 4.23 4.66 4.49 4.41 
MT 4.65 4.61 4.63 4.07 4.77 4.61 4.69 4.81 4.72 4.70 4.71 4.41 
NL 5.31 5.26 5.28 4.07 5.98 5.81 5.89 4.81 5.38 5.32 5.35 4.41 
PL 3.29 3.18 3.21 4.07 4.07 4.03 4.04 4.81 4.22 4.22 4.22 4.41 
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PT 3.53 3.28 3.43 4.07 3.67 3.44 3.58 4.81 4.47 4.55 4.50 4.41 
RO 2.58 2.30 2.43 4.07 3.37 3.13 3.24 4.81 4.38 4.55 4.47 4.41 
SE 6.49 6.17 6.30 4.07 6.58 6.16 6.32 4.81 4.52 4.36 4.42 4.41 
SI 2.91 3.16 3.11 4.07 3.41 3.59 3.55 4.81 4.29 4.55 4.50 4.41 
SK 3.01 3.13 3.11 4.07 3.75 3.72 3.72 4.81 4.03 4.24 4.20 4.41 
UK 4.17 4.37 4.26 4.07 5.29 5.66 5.45 4.81 3.25 3.28 3.26 4.41 
 
Trust in the police Trust in the government 
Trust in the local (municipal) 
authorities 
AT 7.06 6.89 6.92 5.81 5.22 4.63 4.74 4.09 6.16 6.57 6.50 5.12 
BE 5.40 6.02 5.84 5.81 4.69 4.36 4.46 4.09 5.77 6.19 6.07 5.12 
BG 3.57 4.29 4.22 5.81 3.43 3.47 3.47 4.09 3.53 3.92 3.88 5.12 
CY 4.75 4.40 4.58 5.81 3.67 3.60 3.64 4.09 5.37 4.65 5.03 5.12 
CZ 5.33 5.01 5.10 5.81 3.77 3.07 3.27 4.09 5.18 5.60 5.49 5.12 
DE 6.65 6.82 6.75 5.81 4.80 4.95 4.89 4.09 5.59 6.12 5.92 5.12 
DK 7.76 7.83 7.81 5.81 6.40 5.41 5.71 4.09 6.87 6.41 6.55 5.12 
EE 6.39 6.40 6.40 5.81 4.26 4.61 4.45 4.09 5.20 5.66 5.46 5.12 
ES 5.97 6.17 6.07 5.81 3.62 3.71 3.67 4.09 4.55 5.25 4.91 5.12 
FI 8.23 8.01 8.11 5.81 6.48 5.98 6.21 4.09 6.24 6.11 6.17 5.12 
FR 5.72 5.79 5.75 5.81 4.17 3.83 4.02 4.09 5.90 6.22 6.04 5.12 
GR 4.26 4.73 4.47 5.81 1.90 2.25 2.06 4.09 3.47 3.44 3.46 5.12 
HR 4.51 4.71 4.65 5.81 3.41 3.31 3.34 4.09 3.29 3.37 3.35 5.12 
HU 5.30 4.96 5.04 5.81 3.86 3.44 3.55 4.09 5.08 4.56 4.69 5.12 
IE 6.26 6.85 6.40 5.81 3.66 4.10 3.76 4.09 5.20 5.47 5.26 5.12 
IS 7.88 7.99 7.92 5.81 4.26 4.08 4.20 4.09 5.07 5.95 5.36 5.12 
IT 5.87 5.64 5.72 5.81 2.97 3.02 3.00 4.09 4.10 4.12 4.11 5.12 
LU 6.56 6.46 6.48 5.81 6.72 6.48 6.52 4.09 7.03 6.58 6.66 5.12 
LV 4.88 4.93 4.91 5.81 3.06 3.04 3.05 4.09 4.88 5.33 5.15 5.12 
MT 6.25 6.30 6.27 5.81 4.95 5.01 4.98 4.09 5.40 5.42 5.41 5.12 
NL 6.42 6.57 6.50 5.81 5.30 5.47 5.39 4.09 5.82 5.99 5.91 5.12 
PL 4.99 5.26 5.17 5.81 3.47 3.42 3.44 4.09 4.21 4.65 4.51 5.12 
PT 5.39 5.67 5.50 5.81 3.26 3.14 3.21 4.09 4.72 5.39 4.98 5.12 
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RO 4.50 4.54 4.52 5.81 2.68 2.43 2.55 4.09 4.34 5.22 4.82 5.12 
SE 6.65 6.74 6.71 5.81 6.24 5.86 6.01 4.09 5.92 5.88 5.89 5.12 
SI 4.98 5.01 5.00 5.81 3.04 2.77 2.83 4.09 3.74 4.53 4.36 5.12 
SK 4.77 4.71 4.72 5.81 2.96 3.21 3.17 4.09 4.03 5.29 5.08 5.12 
UK 6.38 6.65 6.50 5.81 4.21 4.54 4.36 4.09 5.22 5.54 5.36 5.12 
Source: own computations based on the European Quality of Life Survey 2012. 
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In the data set all indicators simultaneously satisfy the conditions skewness < 2 and kurtosis < 3.5 
(Dybczyński 1980; Velasco & Verma 1998), which indicates lack of non-normal distribution and lack 
of outliers. 
In the next step, we verified the underlying structure of the data measuring the institutional trust. As 
our aim was to construct a composite indicator measuring the level of institutional trust in (1) cities 
and (2) towns, suburbs and rural areas (Index of Institutional Trust (IIT)), we performed the data 
consistency check using data aggregated at the (1) cities and (2) towns, suburbs and rural areas (i.e. 
data presented in Table 3). Because we assume that the ITI is more formative than reflective in 
nature, implying that the variables chosen form the index rather than reflect the existence of the 
institutional trust, after analysing the correlation matrix, principal component analysis (PCA) was 
employed. The analysis of the correlation matrix showed that all variables are correlated positively 
(as expected) and significantly at the 0.01 significance level (Table 4). The results of the PCA 
confirm the one-dimensionality of the IIT (see Table 5). The KMO amounted to 0.848, the first 
eigenvalue amounted to 4.883, the first principal component explained 81.39 % of the variance 
observed in the six indicators and all loadings related to the first principal component were positive. 
Table 4. Correlation matrix — Index of Institutional Trust 
 
Q28a Q28b Q28c Q28d Q28e Q28f 
 
Correlation 
with IIT 
Importance 
(rescaled to 
unity sum r2) 
Q28a 1.000 
     
 0.962 0.19 
Q28b 0.927* 1.000 
    
 0.968 0.19 
Q28c 0.627* 0.620* 1.000 
   
 0.733 0.11 
Q28d 0.805* 0.904* 0.577* 1.000 
  
 0.895 0.16 
Q28e 0.967* 0.889* 0.621* 0.764* 1.000 
 
 0.940 0.18 
Q28f 0.810* 0.823* 0.721* 0.732* 0.781* 1.000  0.890 0.16 
* significant at 0.01 
Source: own computations based on the European Quality of Life Survey 2012 
 
Table 5. The PCA results — Index of institutional trust 
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Variable Communalities Loadings of the first PC 
Q28a .915 .956 
Q28b .923 .961 
Q28c .573 .757 
Q28d .789 .888 
Q28e .874 .935 
Q28f .809 .900 
KMO 0.848 
Eigenvalues 4.883.543.285.209.054.027  
Variance explained by the first principal component 81.39 % 
* Communality should be at least 0.5; KMO should be at least 0.5. 
Source: own computations based on the European Quality of Life Survey 2012. 
 
Having confirmed one-dimensionality of the institutional trust concept, in the following step, we 
aggregated variables into the IIT. We used the arithmetic average with equal weights. The scores of 
the IIT and the ranks presented in Table 6 and illustrated in Figure 8. 
Table 6. Index of Institutional Trust — Country, cities and towns, suburbs and rural areas scores 
Country Cities Towns, suburbs and rural areas Country 
GR 2.910 3.149 3.020 
HR 3.480 3.516 3.505 
BG 3.224 3.578 3.539 
RO 3.643 3.694 3.671 
SI 3.728 3.935 3.891 
SK 3.759 4.049 4.000 
IT 4.035 4.011 4.020 
LV 3.985 4.077 4.041 
HU 4.362 3.956 4.060 
PL 4.042 4.125 4.099 
CY 4.344 3.987 4.178 
PT 4.174 4.245 4.202 
CZ 4.600 4.271 4.363 
IE 4.598 4.774 4.638 
ES 4.553 4.722 4.639 
UK 4.754 5.007 4.863 
FR 5.024 4.844 4.945 
EE 4.982 5.163 5.084 
MT 5.122 5.110 5.116 
BE 5.072 5.149 5.126 
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IS 5.367 5.472 5.402 
DE 5.504 5.704 5.626 
AT 6.023 5.587 5.671 
NL 5.701 5.735 5.719 
SE 6.066 5.861 5.941 
LU 6.372 6.135 6.175 
FI 6.664 6.293 6.457 
DK 6.872 6.394 6.537 
Source: own computations based on the European Quality of Life Survey 2012. 
 
With respect to within-country variability of the institutional trust, it is noticeable that in general the 
level of this phenomenon is not diversified (see also Figures 2-8). However, in Denmark, Austria, 
Hungary, Finland, Cyprus, Bulgaria and the Czech Republic the recorded differences are the highest 
and always in favour of cities. The only exception to this reasoning is Bulgaria, where institutional 
trust is higher in towns, suburbs and rural areas than in cities. 
 
 
Figure 8. Index of Institutional Trust in European (1) countries, (2) cities, and (3) towns, suburbs and rural 
areas — sorted according to the differences between (2) cities, and (3) towns, suburbs and rural areas with 
worse city performance on the left end and better city performance on the right. 
Source: own computations based on the European Quality of Life Survey 2012. 
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To verify if the IIT is statistically well balanced, we calculated the correlation coefficients between 
the variables and the IIT (see Table 4, column Correlation with IIT). The importance of each 
variable comprised in the IIT is presented in Table 4 (column Importance). As can be seen in Table 
4, the IIT is well balanced with one exception. Variable Q28c corresponding to trust to the press 
slightly stands out, implying its influence on the IIT is almost half less than the remaining variables. 
Finally, to assess the robustness of the IIT with regard to the normative assumption related to the 
compensability and importance of variables, which was made during the conceptualisation step, we 
performed uncertainty analysis. The aim of this analysis was to measure the overall variation in IIT 
scores and ranks resulting from the uncertainty linked to the assumptions made. 
As can be noticed in Figure 9, the median simulated scores are almost as the reference scores. The 
same applies to IIT ranks (Figure 10). The median simulated ranks are almost as the reference ranks. 
Then, the length of the confidence intervals computed as (median – 5th percentile; median + 95th 
percentile) is negligible with respect to both scores and ranks. These results show that the IIT is 
robust to the methodological assumptions made during the construction process. 
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Figure 9. Uncertainty analysis — Index of Institutional Trust scores. 
Source: own computations based on the European Quality of Life Survey 2012. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Uncertainty analysis — Index of Institutional Trust ranks. 
Source: own computations based on the European Quality Life Survey 2012. 
 
 
 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
G
…
G
R
_
r B
…
H
…
H
R
_
r
B
G
_
r R
…
R
O
_
r
S
I_
d
S
K
_
d
S
I_
r
H
U
_
r
L
V
_
d
C
Y
_
r
IT
_
r
IT
_
d
P
L
_
d
S
K
_
r
L
V
_
r
P
L
_
r
P
T
_
d
P
T
_
r
C
Z
_
r
C
Y
_
d H
…
E
S
_
d
IE
_
d
C
Z
_
d
E
S
_
r U
…
IE
_
r
F
R
_
r
E
E
_
d
U
K
_
r
F
R
_
d
B
E
_
d
M
T
_
r
M
…
B
E
_
r
E
E
_
r
IS
_
d
IS
_
r D
…
A
T
_
r
N
L
_
d
D
E
_
r
N
L
_
r
S
E
_
r
A
T
_
d
S
E
_
d
L
U
_
r
F
I_
r
L
U
_
d
D
K
_
r
F
I_
d D
…
G
R
H
R
B
G
R
O S
I
S
K IT L
V
H
U P
L
C
Y
P
T
C
Z IE E
S
U
K F
R
E
E
M
T
B
E IS
D
E
A
T
N
L
S
E
L
U F
I
D
K
th
e 
hi
gh
er
, 
th
e 
be
tt
er
 
reference IIT - scores
median simulated IIT - scores
country 
1
5
9
13
17
21
25
29
33
37
41
45
49
53
57
61
65
69
73
77
81
85
G
R
_
d
G
R
_
r
B
G
_
d
H
R
_
d
H
R
_
r
B
G
_
r
R
O
_
d
R
O
_
r
S
I_
d
S
K
_
d
S
I_
r
H
U
_
r
L
V
_
d
C
Y
_
r
IT
_
r
IT
_
d
P
L
_
d
S
K
_
r
L
V
_
r
P
L
_
r
P
T
_
d
P
T
_
r
C
Z
_
r
C
Y
_
d
H
U
_
d
E
S
_
d
IE
_
d
C
Z
_
d
E
S
_
r
U
K
_
d
IE
_
r
F
R
_
r
E
E
_
d
U
K
_
r
F
R
_
d
B
E
_
d
M
T
_
r
M
T
_
d
B
E
_
r
E
E
_
r
IS
_
d
IS
_
r
D
E
_
d
A
T
_
r
N
L
_
d
D
E
_
r
N
L
_
r
S
E
_
r
A
T
_
d
S
E
_
d
L
U
_
r
F
I_
r
L
U
_
d
D
K
_
r
F
I_
d
D
K
_
d
G
R
H
R
B
G
R
O
S
I
S
K
ITL
V
H
U
P
L
C
Y
P
T
C
Z
IEE
S
U
K
F
R
E
E
M
T
B
E
ISD
E
A
T
N
L
S
E
L
U
F
I
D
K
th
e 
hi
gh
er
, 
th
e 
be
tt
er
 
reference IIT - ranks
median simulated IIT - ranks
country 
degree of urbanisation 
degree of urbanisation 
38 
 
5.4. Quality of public service 
Quality of public service is measured using data from seven questions (measured on a scale from 1 
— ‘very poor quality’ to 10 — ‘very high quality’) presented in Table 7. The questions describe 
quality of the following public service: health services, education system, public transport, child-care 
services, long-term care service, social or municipal housing, state pension system. 
 
Table 7. Questions measuring quality of public service 
Label Question 
Quality of public service 
Q53a Health services/How would you rate the quality of each of the following public services? 
Q53b Education system/How would you rate the quality of each of the following public services? 
Q53c Public transport/How would you rate the quality of each of the following public services? 
Q53d Child-care services/How would you rate the quality of each of the following public services? 
Q53e Long-term care services/How would you rate the quality of each of the following public services? 
Q53f 
Social/municipal housing/How would you rate the quality of each of the following public 
services? 
Q53g State pension system/How would you rate the quality of each of the following public services? 
 
The perceived level of quality of each of the enumerated above public services in each of the 
analysed country with respect to (1) country level as well as (2) cities and (3) towns, suburbs and 
rural areas is presented in Figure 11-17 and in Table 8. Due to an unsatisfactory response rate (see 
Table A1 in the Appendix) the estimates related to the quality of child-care services (q28d), long-
term care services (q28e), social/municipal housing (q28f) and state pension system (q28g) should be 
treated with caution. 
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Figure 11. Quality of health service in European (1) countries, (2) cities, and (3) towns, suburbs and rural 
areas — sorted according to the differences between (2) cities, and (3) towns, suburbs and rural areas with 
worse city performance on the left end and better city performance on the right. 
Source: own computations based on the European Quality of Life Survey 2012. 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Quality of education system in European (1) countries, (2) cities, and (3) towns, suburbs and rural 
areas — sorted according to the differences between (2) cities, and (3) towns, suburbs and rural areas with 
worse city performance on the left end and better city performance on the right. 
Source: own computations based on the European Quality of Life Survey 2012. 
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Figure 13. Quality of public transport in European (1) countries, (2) cities, and (3) towns, suburbs and rural 
areas — sorted according to the differences between (2) cities, and (3) towns, suburbs and rural areas with 
worse city performance on the left end and better city performance on the right. 
Source: own computations based on the European Quality of Life Survey 2012. 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Quality of child-care services in European (1) countries, (2) cities, and (3) towns, suburbs and rural 
areas — sorted according to the differences between (2) cities, and (3) towns, suburbs and rural areas with 
worse city performance on the left end and better city performance on the right. 
Source: own computations based on the European Quality of Life Survey 2012. 
 
Quality of child-care services 
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Figure 15. Quality of long-term care services in European (1) countries, (2) cities, and (3) towns, suburbs and 
rural areas — sorted according to the differences between (2) cities, and (3) towns, suburbs and rural areas 
with worse city performance on the left end and better city performance on the right. 
Source: own computations based on the European Quality of Life Survey 2012. 
 
 
Figure 16. Quality of social or municipal housing in European (1) countries, (2) cities, and (3) towns, 
suburbs and rural areas — sorted according to the differences between (2) cities, and (3) towns, 
suburbs and rural areas with worse city performance on the left end and better city performance on 
the right. 
Source: own computations based on the European quality of life survey 2012. 
 
 
Quality of long-term care services 
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Figure 17. Quality of state pension system in European (1) countries, (2) cities, and (3) towns, 
suburbs and rural areas — sorted according to the differences between (2) cities, and (3) towns, 
suburbs and rural areas with worse city performance on the left end and better city performance on 
the right. 
Source: own computations based on the European quality of life survey 2012. 
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Table 8. Perceived level of quality of public services in European countries with respect to cities and towns, suburbs and rural areas. 
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Quality of health services Quality of education system Quality of public transport 
AT 8.19 8.00 8.04 6.27 6.88 7.34 7.25 6.28 8.52 6.97 7.27 6.35 
BE 7.82 7.70 7.73 6.27 7.18 7.55 7.44 6.28 6.77 6.56 6.62 6.35 
BG 4.29 4.70 4.65 6.27 4.23 5.26 5.15 6.28 5.40 5.45 5.45 6.35 
CY 5.35 5.38 5.37 6.27 6.08 5.75 5.92 6.28 6.99 6.60 6.81 6.35 
CZ 6.74 6.44 6.53 6.27 6.64 6.65 6.64 6.28 6.67 5.87 6.09 6.35 
DE 6.69 6.59 6.63 6.27 6.37 6.50 6.45 6.28 7.28 6.76 6.96 6.35 
DK 7.57 7.31 7.38 6.27 7.71 7.42 7.51 6.28 6.56 6.40 6.45 6.35 
EE 5.39 6.01 5.74 6.27 5.77 6.55 6.20 6.28 6.65 6.11 6.35 6.35 
ES 7.03 6.98 7.00 6.27 6.58 6.61 6.59 6.28 7.19 6.61 6.91 6.35 
FI 7.21 7.04 7.11 6.27 8.26 8.11 8.18 6.28 7.49 6.50 6.94 6.35 
FR 7.00 6.68 6.86 6.27 6.14 6.09 6.12 6.28 6.77 6.25 6.55 6.35 
GR 4.54 5.04 4.77 6.27 4.35 4.72 4.52 6.28 5.45 5.11 5.29 6.35 
HR 5.49 5.40 5.43 6.27 5.79 6.05 5.97 6.28 6.32 5.63 5.85 6.35 
HU 5.15 5.09 5.10 6.27 5.61 5.78 5.74 6.28 5.35 5.58 5.52 6.35 
IE 4.68 5.16 4.79 6.27 6.51 7.06 6.64 6.28 6.04 6.51 6.15 6.35 
IS 7.49 6.79 7.26 6.27 7.50 7.64 7.55 6.28 5.46 6.38 5.77 6.35 
IT 5.57 5.47 5.51 6.27 5.70 5.75 5.73 6.28 5.44 5.37 5.39 6.35 
LU 7.52 7.44 7.46 6.27 6.80 6.46 6.51 6.28 8.10 7.37 7.51 6.35 
LV 5.17 5.14 5.15 6.27 5.62 6.04 5.87 6.28 6.98 6.22 6.52 6.35 
MT 7.31 7.20 7.25 6.27 7.60 7.64 7.62 6.28 4.09 4.02 4.06 6.35 
NL 7.17 7.19 7.18 6.27 6.83 6.99 6.91 6.28 6.74 6.49 6.61 6.35 
PL 4.52 4.77 4.69 6.27 5.75 6.04 5.95 6.28 5.87 5.62 5.70 6.35 
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PT 5.58 5.37 5.50 6.27 5.88 5.60 5.77 6.28 6.33 5.08 5.85 6.35 
RO 4.57 4.73 4.66 6.27 4.96 5.36 5.17 6.28 6.23 6.19 6.21 6.35 
SE 7.30 7.33 7.31 6.27 7.12 6.99 7.04 6.28 7.03 6.61 6.78 6.35 
SI 6.13 6.42 6.36 6.27 6.58 6.90 6.83 6.28 6.80 6.03 6.20 6.35 
SK 4.93 4.84 4.86 6.27 5.70 5.74 5.73 6.28 6.40 5.52 5.67 6.35 
UK 6.86 7.07 6.95 6.27 6.76 6.91 6.82 6.28 6.69 6.57 6.64 6.35 
 
Quality of child-care services Quality of long-term care services Quality of social municipal housing 
AT 6.68 7.40 7.28 6.21 6.34 7.18 7.05 5.84 7.40 7.18 7.22 5.42 
BE 6.48 6.91 6.78 6.21 6.93 7.15 7.09 5.84 5.80 6.52 6.31 5.42 
BG 4.68 5.29 5.22 6.21 3.44 3.89 3.84 5.84 2.86 3.33 3.26 5.42 
CY 7.51 6.80 7.16 6.21 5.99 5.91 5.95 5.84 5.89 5.92 5.90 5.42 
CZ 6.67 6.63 6.64 6.21 5.77 6.02 5.95 5.84 4.98 5.04 5.03 5.42 
DE 6.51 6.72 6.64 6.21 6.23 6.50 6.40 5.84 6.21 6.12 6.15 5.42 
DK 7.36 7.19 7.24 6.21 6.81 6.64 6.70 5.84 6.72 6.76 6.75 5.42 
EE 5.97 6.47 6.26 6.21 5.05 5.48 5.31 5.84 5.08 5.32 5.21 5.42 
ES 6.46 6.51 6.49 6.21 6.10 6.21 6.15 5.84 5.40 5.60 5.50 5.42 
FI 7.77 7.65 7.70 6.21 6.29 6.39 6.35 5.84 6.63 6.67 6.65 5.42 
FR 6.28 6.28 6.28 6.21 6.56 6.47 6.52 5.84 5.54 5.73 5.62 5.42 
GR 4.78 5.00 4.87 6.21 4.43 4.53 4.47 5.84 4.28 3.47 3.97 5.42 
HR 6.06 6.14 6.11 6.21 4.94 5.37 5.24 5.84 4.25 4.34 4.31 5.42 
HU 5.44 5.78 5.70 6.21 5.19 5.21 5.20 5.84 4.29 4.39 4.37 5.42 
IE 5.61 6.77 5.92 6.21 4.75 5.82 5.03 5.84 5.25 5.92 5.42 5.42 
IS 7.36 7.53 7.42 6.21 6.22 6.51 6.32 5.84 6.00 6.11 6.04 5.42 
IT 5.75 5.77 5.76 6.21 5.15 5.21 5.18 5.84 4.86 5.05 4.98 5.42 
LU 7.51 7.36 7.38 6.21 7.56 7.57 7.57 5.84 6.42 6.34 6.35 5.42 
LV 5.61 6.09 5.92 6.21 4.86 5.31 5.18 5.84 5.44 5.24 5.31 5.42 
MT 7.87 7.55 7.71 6.21 7.56 7.04 7.30 5.84 6.57 6.57 6.57 5.42 
NL 6.75 7.00 6.89 6.21 6.55 6.72 6.64 5.84 6.37 6.58 6.48 5.42 
PL 5.35 5.58 5.50 6.21 4.76 4.95 4.89 5.84 4.02 4.09 4.07 5.42 
PT 6.24 5.79 6.06 6.21 5.62 5.30 5.48 5.84 5.69 5.17 5.48 5.42 
RO 5.11 4.93 5.01 6.21 4.80 4.53 4.65 5.84 4.33 3.93 4.11 5.42 
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SE 7.32 7.26 7.28 6.21 5.77 5.58 5.64 5.84 6.35 6.33 6.34 5.42 
SI 5.89 6.87 6.65 6.21 5.35 6.35 6.12 5.84 4.51 5.27 5.07 5.42 
SK 6.16 5.86 5.91 6.21 5.43 5.01 5.09 5.84 4.59 4.75 4.72 5.42 
UK 6.22 6.43 6.31 6.21 5.74 5.83 5.78 5.84 5.49 5.58 5.52 5.42 
 
Quality of state pension system 
        
AT 6.66 6.15 4.83 6.24 
        
BE 5.85 5.84 4.83 5.84 
        
BG 2.88 2.89 4.83 2.89 
        
CY 3.82 4.88 4.83 4.30 
        
CZ 4.19 4.14 4.83 4.15 
        
DE 5.23 5.27 4.83 5.25 
        
DK 6.35 6.35 4.83 6.35 
        
EE 3.65 4.15 4.83 3.93 
        
ES 5.45 5.18 4.83 5.31 
        
FI 6.87 6.57 4.83 6.70 
        
FR 5.12 4.83 4.83 4.99 
        
GR 3.14 3.31 4.83 3.22 
        
HR 3.46 3.92 4.83 3.78 
        
HU 3.90 3.74 4.83 3.78 
        
IE 5.29 5.60 4.83 5.36 
        
IS 5.45 5.19 4.83 5.36 
        
IT 4.72 4.72 4.83 4.72 
        
LU 7.30 7.59 4.83 7.55 
        
LV 3.44 3.37 4.83 3.40 
        
MT 7.30 7.18 4.83 7.24 
        
NL 6.62 6.66 4.83 6.64 
        
PL 3.31 3.44 4.83 3.40 
        
PT 3.98 3.80 4.83 3.91 
        
RO 4.47 3.87 4.83 4.14 
        
SE 5.52 5.20 4.83 5.32 
        
SI 3.58 4.17 4.83 4.04 
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SK 3.96 3.54 4.83 3.61 
        
UK 5.03 5.13 4.83 5.07 
        
Source: own computations based on the European Quality of Life Survey 2012. 
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Due to low response rate (see Table A1 in the Appendix) we decided to exclude from the further 
analyses questions related to the quality of child-care services (q28d), long-term care services (q28e), 
social/municipal housing (q28f) and state pension system (q28g). Missing data regarding the above 
enumerated services might reflect lack of item relevance to residents who did not rely on these 
services and therefore had no opinions about them. As a consequence the CI will comprise 
questions related to the quality of health services, education system and public transport. Three 
remaining indicators simultaneously satisfy the conditions skewness < 2 and kurtosis < 3.5 
(Dybczyński 1980; Velasco & Verma 1998), which indicates lack of non-normal distribution and lack 
of outliers. 
In the next step, we verified the underlying structure of the data measuring the quality of public 
service concept. As our aim was to construct a composite indicator measuring the level of quality of 
public service in (1) cities and (2) towns, suburbs and rural areas (Index of Quality of Public Service 
(IQPS)), we performed the data consistency check using data aggregated at the (1) cities and (2) 
towns, suburbs and rural areas (i.e. data presented in Table 8). Because we assume that the IQPS is 
more formative than reflective in nature, after analysing the correlation matrix, principal component 
analysis (PCA) was used. 
The analysis of the correlation matrix showed that all variables are correlated positively (as expected) 
and significantly at either 0.05 or 0.01 significance level ( 
Table 9). The results of the PCA confirm the one-dimensionality of the IQPS (see Table 10). The 
KMO amounted to 0.540, the first eigenvalue amounted to 2.065, the first principal component 
explained 68.83 % of the variance observed in the seven indicators and all loadings related to the 
first principal component were positive. 
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Table 9. Correlation matrix — Index of Quality of Public Service 
 
Q58a Q58b Q58c  
Correlation 
with IQPS 
Importance (rescaled 
to unity sum r2) 
Q58a 1.000 
  
 0.935 0.38 
Q58b 0.815** 1.000 
 
 0.863 0.35 
Q58c 0.442** 0.286* 1.000  0.666 0.27 
* significant at 0.05; ** significant at 0.01 
Source: own computations based on the European Quality of Life Survey 2012. 
 
 
Table 10. PCA — Index of Quality of Public Service 
Variable Communalities Loadings of the first PC 
Q58a .883 .940 
Q58b .788 .888 
Q58c .393 .627 
KMO 0.540 
Eigenvalues 2.065.768.167  
Variance explained by the first principal component 68.83 % 
Source: own computations based on the European Quality of Life Survey 2012. 
 
Having confirmed one-dimensionality of the quality of public service concept, in the following step, 
we aggregated variables into the IQPS. We again used arithmetic average with equal weights. The 
scores of the IQPS are presented in Table 11 and illustrated in Figure 18. 
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Figure 18. Index of Quality of Public Service in European (1) countries, (2) cities, and (3) towns, 
suburbs and rural areas — sorted according to the differences between (2) cities, and (3) towns, 
suburbs and rural areas with worse city performance on the left end and better city performance on 
the right. 
Source: own computations based on the European Quality of Life Survey 2012. 
 
 
With respect to within-country variability of the quality of public service, it is noticeable that there 
are countries in which we observe almost no differences in the level of this phenomenon (middle 
part of Figure 18). However, there are also countries in which considerable differences with respect 
to the quality of public service are observed. To these we can include France, the Netherlands, 
Ireland, Spain and Belgium in which cities performed better than other areas. In Denmark and 
Bulgaria, the quality of public service is considerably better in towns, suburbs and rural areas. 
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Table 11. Index of Quality of Public Service — Country, cities and towns, suburbs and rural areas scores 
Country 
label 
Cities Towns, suburbs and rural areas Country 
LV 4.778 4.958 4.861 
BG 4.642 5.139 5.085 
MT 5.252 5.425 5.346 
SK 5.673 5.369 5.421 
LU 5.379 5.475 5.444 
IT 5.368 5.482 5.453 
AT 5.569 5.530 5.545 
FR 5.931 5.352 5.706 
GR 5.868 5.695 5.750 
CZ 5.922 5.800 5.850 
DE 5.744 6.243 5.858 
EE 6.139 5.910 6.031 
IS 5.937 6.224 6.098 
RO 6.333 6.283 6.308 
BE 6.684 6.318 6.420 
FI 6.500 6.452 6.465 
HR 6.639 6.342 6.513 
PL 6.781 6.616 6.681 
PT 6.772 6.849 6.806 
HU 6.935 6.731 6.834 
CY 6.820 6.937 6.859 
DK 6.914 6.888 6.902 
SE 7.149 6.975 7.043 
UK 7.279 7.043 7.116 
ES 7.474 7.091 7.159 
SI 7.255 7.271 7.266 
NL 7.651 7.218 7.413 
IE 7.864 7.437 7.520 
Source: own computations based on the European Quality of Life Survey 2012. 
 
 
To verify if the IQPS is statistically balanced, we calculated the correlation coefficients between the 
variables and the IQPS (see  
Table 9, column Correlation with IQPS). The importance of each variable comprised in the IQPS is 
presented in Table 9 (column Importance). As can be seen, the IQPS is well balanced with one 
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exception. Variable Q58c corresponding to quality of public transport stands out, implying that its 
influence on the IQPS is almost lower than the remaining two variables. 
Finally, to assess the robustness of the IQPS with regard to the normative assumption related to the 
compensability and importance of variables, which was made during the conceptualisation step, we 
performed uncertainty analysis. The aim of this analysis was to measure the overall variation in IQPS 
scores and ranks resulting from the uncertainty linked to the assumptions made (see Figure 19 and 
Figure 20). 
 
Figure 19. Uncertainty analysis — Index of Quality of Public Service scores. 
Source: own computations based on the European Quality of Life Survey 2012. 
 
 
The same as in the case of the IIT also in the case of the IPQS the median simulated scores are 
almost as the reference scores. The same applies to IPQS ranks. The median simulated ranks are 
almost as the reference ranks. Then, the length of the confidence intervals computed as (median –
 5th percentile; median + 95th percentile) is negligible with respect to both scores and ranks. These 
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results show that the IPQS is robust to the methodological assumptions made during the 
construction process. 
 
 
Figure 20. Uncertainty analysis — Index of Quality of Public Service ranks. 
Source: own computations based on the European Quality of Life Survey 2012 
 
 
In general, the correlation analyses and the PCA showed that both concepts, namely the institutional 
trust measured by the Index of the Institutional Trust and the quality of public service measured by 
the Index of Quality of Public Service, are one-dimensional. In addition, almost equal principal 
components loadings and importance imply that applying an equal weighting scheme, the one we 
applied, was valid. 
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6. Trust, attitude towards free-riding and quality of governance in the EU cities 
6.1. Polish cities 
6.1.1. Polish Social Diagnosis survey 
 
The Social Diagnosis survey ( 5 ) is aimed at providing comparable and reliable data on living 
conditions and quality of life quality of life in Poland. The survey is based on panel research and 
investigates households and their members aged 16 and above using two separate questionnaires — 
for a household and individual. Provided that the weights are used (different for cross-sectional and 
panel data), the survey is representative with respect to NUTS2, gender, age, education, social and 
professional status, marital status, household size, place of residence, main source of income, and 
household type (established on the basis of the number of families and biological family type). Upon 
completion of the fieldwork, the total number of households interviewed was 12,387 in 2011 and 
12,355 in 2013, which resulted in 26,453 and 26,307 individuals surveyed in 2011 and 2013 
(Czapinski 2011). We identified the Social Diagnosis survey as the only one among country-specific 
household surveys providing us with not only city identifier but also with sufficient sample size at 
the city level. We recall, however, that due to sampling strategy these city samples are not fully 
representative with respect to other descriptive characteristics of citizens. The sample sizes per city 
and the number of ‘don’t know’ answers as well as refusals referring to each analysed question are 
presented in the Appendix in Table A2. 
Based on data from the Social Diagnosis Survey, we measure two phenomena: generalised trust and 
attitude towards free-riding using two last waves (2011 and 2013) of the survey to increase precision. 
Generalised trust is measured with a single question and attitude towards free-riding is measured 
                                                        
(5) http://www.diagnoza.com/ 
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with a composite indicator, i.e. Index of Free-Riding computed as the arithmetic average with equal 
weighting. The aim is to show variability of the phenomena in the 27 of the largest Polish cities. 
 
6.1.2. General trust in Polish cities 
 
In order to measure general trust in Polish cities, answers to the following question were analysed: 
‘Generally, do you believe that you can trust most people, or do you think you can never be too 
careful?’ Possible answers were following: ‘(1) you can trust most people and (2) you can never be 
too careful’. We compared the situation in Polish cities using percentages of people who claimed 
that most people can be trusted (Table 12 and Figure 21). 
The results show that people living in Torun, Wroclaw and Ruda Slaska trust other people the most 
and habitants of Jaworzno trust other people the least (measured by the percentage of people who 
trust others). Among the highest scoring cities are the capital Warsaw and Cracow. 
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Table 12. Percentages of people who claim that most people can be trusted, by city 
City You can trust 
most people 
You can never 
be too careful 
Difficult to say 
Bialystok 10.5 % 81.4 % 8.2 % 
Bielsko-Biala 17.2 % 74.3 % 8.4 % 
Bydgoszcz 15.4 % 75.8 % 8.8 % 
Czestochowa 10.3 % 86.0 % 3.7 % 
Gdansk 15.1 % 75.8 % 9.1 % 
Gdynia 16.6 % 76.0 % 7.4 % 
Gliwice 10.6 % 84.6 % 4.8 % 
Gorzow Wielkopolski 10.0 % 82.1 % 7.9 % 
Jaworzno 1.0 % 93.8 % 5.3 % 
Katowice 15.0 % 75.1 % 9.9 % 
Kielce 12.9 % 76.8 % 10.3 % 
Krakow 19.6 % 71.8 % 8.6 % 
Lodz 9.5 % 81.6 % 8.9 % 
Lublin 13.4 % 79.3 % 7.3 % 
Olsztyn 17.8 % 68.9 % 13.3 % 
Opole 14.4 % 81.0 % 4.6 % 
Poznan 14.2 % 79.2 % 6.6 % 
Radom 9.0 % 83.6 % 7.4 % 
Ruda Slaska 19.6 % 73.4 % 7.0 % 
Sosnowiec 11.3 % 74.9 % 13.8 % 
Szczecin 14.9 % 75.1 % 10.0 % 
Torun 20.3 % 74.3 % 5.4 % 
Walbrzych 7.0 % 81.1 % 11.9 % 
Warszawa 18.3 % 74.2 % 7.5 % 
Wloclawek 15.3 % 69.7 % 15.0 % 
Wroclaw 20.3 % 73.0 % 6.7 % 
Zabrze 17.4 % 78.6 % 4.1 % 
Poland 12.8 % 77.2 %   10.0 % 
    
Min 1.0 % 69.7 %  
Max 20.3 % 93.8 %  
Source: own computation based on the Social Diagnosis survey 2013 and 2011. 
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Figure 21. Percentages of people who claim that most people can be trusted, by city. 
Source: own computation based on the Social Diagnosis survey 2013 and 2011. 
 
6.1.3. Attitude towards free-riding in Polish cities 
 
In order to construct the Index of Free-Riding five indicators were used. They are percentages of 
people who, in a given city, care ‘to some extent’ and who ‘care very much’ that certain free-riding 
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activities are not acceptable. The list of activities that were assessed is presented in Table 13 and the 
percentages of people who care are presented in Table 14. 
 
Table 13. Questions measuring attitude towards free-riding 
Label Question 
FR1 Someone pays lower taxes than he/she should 
FR2 Someone avoids paying the fares for public transport (e.g. buses, trains) 
FR3 Someone unjustly draws unemployment benefit 
FR4 Someone unjustly receives disability benefits (on the grounds of being unable to work) 
FR5 Someone files an insurance claim under false pretences 
 
Table 14. Percentage of people who in a given city care ‘to some extent’ and who ‘care very much’. 
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Bialystok 49.3 % 49.5 % 59.8 % 61.4 % 55.1 % 55.03 
Bielsko-Biala 50.5 % 53.6 % 55.5 % 53.6 % 53.0 % 53.23 
Bydgoszcz 50.3 % 43.7 % 55.5 % 60.3 % 56.6 % 53.27 
Czestochowa 47.8 % 45.5 % 53.3 % 57.8 % 53.1 % 51.52 
Gdansk 55.0 % 48.7 % 62.5 % 65.8 % 59.9 % 58.36 
Gdynia 51.8 % 47.1 % 60.7 % 68.2 % 65.3 % 58.62 
Gliwice 44.0 % 49.2 % 62.0 % 64.8 % 60.4 % 56.06 
Gorzow Wielkopolski 47.1 % 52.9 % 62.6 % 62.4 % 58.5 % 56.71 
Jaworzno 55.7 % 33.6 % 64.0 % 67.8 % 61.3 % 56.48 
Katowice 50.6 % 57.0 % 66.9 % 68.2 % 66.6 % 61.84 
Kielce 56.9 % 57.2 % 58.9 % 64.1 % 62.4 % 59.91 
Krakow 57.2 % 53.9 % 61.8 % 63.6 % 63.2 % 59.93 
Lodz 39.3 % 37.2 % 46.0 % 50.3 % 45.2 % 43.61 
Lublin 52.8 % 52.1 % 66.4 % 70.1 % 65.5 % 61.37 
Olsztyn 42.1 % 42.3 % 51.6 % 50.9 % 45.4 % 46.45 
Opole 65.3 % 55.9 % 70.9 % 66.5 % 61.0 % 63.91 
Poznan 55.1 % 48.6 % 66.9 % 65.1 % 65.4 % 60.23 
Radom 44.3 % 43.9 % 54.3 % 57.5 % 52.9 % 50.59 
Ruda Slaska 50.3 % 52.4 % 62.5 % 56.5 % 54.7 % 55.27 
Sosnowiec 41.4 % 45.8 % 55.4 % 52.5 % 52.5 % 49.51 
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Szczecin 44.4 % 41.5 % 58.6 % 60.4 % 54.3 % 51.82 
Torun 59.9 % 53.4 % 64.1 % 64.2 % 58.3 % 60.00 
Walbrzych 37.0 % 49.2 % 47.0 % 64.1 % 38.0 % 40.32 
Warszawa 60.4 % 54.2 % 67.5 % 68.8 % 66.6 % 47.07 
Wloclawek 40.9 % 31.0 % 42.7 % 47.0 % 40.1 % 63.50 
Wroclaw 53.9 % 46.1 % 63.9 % 62.8 % 59.2 % 57.18 
Zabrze 45.8 % 40.3 % 51.4 % 51.3 % 51.9 % 48.16 
Poland 43.2 % 40.8 % 51.7 % 52.1 % 49.0 % 47.38 
       
min 37.0 % 31.0 % 42.7 % 47.0 % 38.0 %  
max 65.3 % 57.2 % 70.9 % 70.1 % 66.6 %  
Source: own computation based on the Social Diagnosis 2013 and 2011 
Estimates for Poland are computed from a nationwide sample with the use of proper weights 
 
In the data set all indicators simultaneously satisfy the conditions skewness < 2 and kurtosis < 3.5 
(Dybczyński 1980; Velasco & Verma 1998), which indicates lack of non-normal distribution and lack 
of outliers. 
In the next step, we verified the underlying structure of the data by measuring the attitude towards 
free-riding. As our aim was to construct a composite indicator to measure the level of civic 
moralities in Polish cities (Index of Free-Riding [IFR]), we performed a data consistency check using 
data aggregated at the cities level (i.e. data presented in Table 14). Because we assume that the ICM 
is more formative than reflective in nature, after analysing the correlation matrix, principal 
component analysis (PCA) was used. 
Table 15. Correlation matrix — Index of Free-Riding 
 
FR1 FR2 FR3 FR4 FR5  
Correlation 
with IFR 
Importance 
(rescaled to 
unity sum r2) 
FR1 1.000 
    
 0.867 0.20 
FR2 0.538* 1.000 
   
 0.748 0.15 
FR3 0.811* 0.630* 1.000 
  
 0.951 0.24 
FR4 0.644* 0.553* 0.799* 1.000 
 
 0.862 0.19 
FR5 0.772* 0.554* 0.894* 0.776* 1.000  0.923 0.22 
* significant at 0.01. 
Source: own computation based on the Social Diagnosis survey 2013 and 2011. 
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The analysis of the correlation matrix showed that all variables are correlated positively (as expected) 
and significantly at the 0.01 significance level (Table 15). The results of the PCA confirm the one-
dimensionality of the IFR (see Table 16). The KMO amounted to 0.869, the first eigenvalue 
amounted to 3.814, the first principal component explained 76.27 % of the variance observed in the 
five indicators and all loadings related to the first principal component were positive. 
Table 16. PCA — Index of Free-Riding 
Variable Communalities Loadings of the first PC 
FR1 .753 .926 
FR2 .537 .901 
FR3 .912 .468 
FR4 .755 .926 
FR5 .857 .934 
KMO 0.869 
Eigenvalues 3.814.544.356.191.095 
Variance explained by the first principal component 76.27 % 
Source: own computation based on the Social Diagnosis survey 2013 and 2011 
 
In general, the correlation table and the PCA show that the attitude towards the free-riding concept 
is coherent. Then, the balanced contribution of the variables to the IFR scores justifies the 
application of the equal weighting scheme. 
Having confirmed one-dimensionality of the attitude towards the free-riding concept, in the 
following step, we aggregated variables into the IFR. We again used an arithmetic average with equal 
weights. The scores of the IFR are presented in Table 14, column IFR and illustrated in Figure 22). 
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Figure 22. Index of Free-Riding, Polish cities. 
Estimate for Poland is computed from the nation-wide sample with the use of proper weights 
Source: own computation based on the Social Diagnosis survey 2013 and 2011. 
 
As can be seen, the places that scored best with respect to attitude towards freeloading are: Opole, 
Warsaw, Katowice, Lublin and Poznan, who all scored at least 60.0 in the IFR. The worst scoring — 
below the country average 47.27 — are Wloclawek, Lodz, Olsztyn and Walbrzych. 
To verify if the IFR is statistically well balanced, we calculated the correlation coefficients between 
the variables and the IFR (see Table 15, column Correlation with ICM). The importance of each 
variable comprised in the IFR is presented in Table 15, (column Importance). As can be seen, the 
IFR is not perfectly balanced but the contribution the variables provide to the IFR is still acceptable. 
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Nevertheless, the variable that contributes the least to the IFR is FR2. This variable relates to free-
riding with respect to the fares for public transport, which, in turn, reflects far more minor 
infraction than the other questions (i.e. the monetary gain is very small compared to the other 
questions). The variables which contribute the most are: FR3 and FR5, which relate to unjust 
drawing of unemployment benefit and filing an insurance claim under false pretences, respectively. 
Finally, to assess the robustness of the IFR with regard to the normative assumption related to the 
compensability and importance of variables, which was made during the conceptualisation step, we 
performed uncertainty analysis. The aim of this analysis was to measure the overall variation in IFR 
scores and ranks resulting from the uncertainty linked to the assumptions — about the aggregation 
method and the aggregation weights — made. Thanks to this, the final scores and ranks are 
presented with uncertainty expressed by the error terms (5th and 95th percentiles) (see Figure 23 and  
Figure 24). 
 
Figure 23. Uncertainty analysis — Index of Free-Riding scores. 
Source: own computation based on the Social Diagnosis survey 2013 and 2011. 
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In the case of the IFR, the median simulated scores are almost the same as the reference scores. The 
same applies to the IFR ranks. The median simulated ranks are almost always equal to the reference 
ranks. The maximum difference observed amounts to 1 position and relates to Kielce. Then, the 
length of the confidence intervals computed as (median – 5th percentile; median + 95th percentile) is 
negligible with respect to scores. The highest length was recorded for Jaworzno and Walbrzych. In 
the case of ranks, the lengths of the confidence intervals are more diversified with a maximum of 
five positions — again for Jaworzno. These results show that the IFR scores are robust in terms of 
the methodological assumptions made during the construction process. The IFR ranks are slightly 
less robust but still at the acceptable level. 
 
 
 
Figure 24. Uncertainty analysis — Index of Free-Riding ranks. 
Source: own computation based on the Social Diagnosis survey 2013 and 2011. 
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6.2. European cities 
6.2.1. World Justice Project — The General Population Poll 
 
In the World Justice Project (WJP) two data sources are used — the General Population Poll (GPP) 
and the qualified respondent’s questionnaire. In our project, we use data from the former and that is 
why we devote the following section to it. 
The GPP was aimed at providing information on the experiences and perceptions of ordinary 
people about their dealings with the government, the police and the courts. It covered issues related 
to the openness and accountability of the state, the extent of corruption and the magnitude of 
common crimes to which the general public is exposed (Botero & Ponce 2010; The World Justice 
Project 2014). 
The data we use were carried out in 2011-2013. In each country a probability sample of 1,000 
respondents was drawn from three largest cities in a way to ensure representativeness (with respect 
to basic demographic features) of population in the country. This type of sampling procedure give 
us a unique opportunity to delve into the city specific circumstances related to the quality of 
institutions and local governance. We are aware, however, of the limitations of our approach. 
Although the data are originally representative at the country level and as such are presented in the 
WJP Rule of Law Index, we use them to investigate phenomena at city level. Although with this 
approach we cannot provide fully representative results, it should be noted that this is the best 
achievable solution at the time being, with which we can still enrich our knowledge about 
institutions-related phenomena in the urban perspective. Nevertheless, to overcome this issue, we 
verified the usefulness of data in city analysis focusing mainly on the sample sizes and accuracy of 
the estimates. We considered also application of the small area estimation technique but in our study 
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its application seemed hardly feasible. Nonetheless, for further research calculation based on the 
pooled (more than one wave) data set can be considered as a practical and feasible solution.   
Based on data from the Rule of Law project, we propose to construct composite indicators (CI) 
related to: 
1. law enforcement (conducted by institution and by citizens) 
2. institutional trust 
3. corruption 
4. paying bribes 
5. performance of local government. 
 
6.2.2. Law enforcement — Institutions and citizens 
 
In order to construct the Index of Law Enforcement eight indicators were used. These questions 
can be answered using one of four answer categories: very likely, likely, unlikely and very unlikely. 
The list of questions that were assessed is presented in Table 17. 
 
 
  
65 
 
Table 17. Questions measuring law enforcement 
Label Question 
q9a 
Please assume that one day the president decides to adopt a policy that is clearly against the 
[COUNTRY’s] constitution: How likely is the national congress/parliament to be able to stop the 
president’s illegal actions?     
q9b 
Please assume that one day the president decides to adopt a policy that is clearly against the 
[COUNTRY’s] constitution: How likely are the courts to be able to stop the president’s illegal 
actions? 
q10a 
Assume that a government officer makes a decision that is clearly illegal and unfair, and people 
complain against this decision before the judges. In practice, how likely is that the judges will be 
able to stop the illegal decision?  
q12a 
If someone commits a homicide in your neighbourhood, how likely is that the criminal is 
prosecuted and convicted?     
q12b 
If a government officer is found unlawfully issuing a government license for personal benefit, how 
likely is this officer to lose his job?   
q12c 
If a police chief is found taking money from a criminal organization, such as a drug cartel or an 
arms smuggler, how likely is this officer to be sent to jail? 
q13a 
Think about business owners engaging in small operations (e.g. selling food in a small 
establishment). How likely do you think it is that these people would be fined if they engage in the 
business operation without the required documentation?   
q13b 
Think about business owners engaging in small operations (e.g. selling food in a small 
establishment). How likely do you think it is that these people would be fined if they do not 
register to pay taxes when they should?   
 
In order to assess the city-level law enforcement, the percentages of people who in a given city claim 
that certain behaviour is ‘likely’ or ‘very likely’ are computed (see Table 18). 
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Table 18. Percentages of people who in a given city claim that certain behaviour is ‘likely’ or ‘very likely’ 
City q9a q9b q10a q12a q12b q12c q13a q13b 
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Belgium_Antwerp 78 % 68 % 70 % 93 % 46 % 55 % 79 % 77 % 
Belgium_Charleroi 68 % 60 % 67 % 89 % 58 % 65 % 67 % 79 % 
Belgium_Ghent 83 % 67 % 74 % 96 % 53 % 61 % 79 % 77 % 
Bulgaria_Plovdiv 58 % 51 % 38 % 86 % 35 % 26 % 87 % 86 % 
Bulgaria_Sofia 61 % 46 % 40 % 65 % 30 % 16 % 85 % 85 % 
67 
 
Bulgaria_Varna 88 % 83 % 72 % 96 % 55 % 27 % 98 % 99 % 
Croatia_Rijeka 26 % 37 % 19 % 97 % 39 % 42 % 82 % 78 % 
Croatia_Split 37 % 45 % 15 % 99 % 39 % 49 % 78 % 75 % 
Croatia_Zagreb 37 % 38 % 23 % 97 % 43 % 50 % 83 % 79 % 
Czech Republic_Brno 73 % 71 % 56 % 94 % 45 % 46 % 85 % 85 % 
Czech Republic_Ostrava 65 % 55 % 49 % 94 % 36 % 45 % 88 % 91 % 
Czech Republic_Prague 65 % 62 % 54 % 93 % 41 % 46 % 83 % 82 % 
Denmark_Aarhus 89 % 83 % 83 % 96 % 83 % 84 % 83 % 83 % 
Denmark_Copenhagen 91 % 87 % 82 % 98 % 83 % 82 % 89 % 90 % 
Denmark_Odense 90 % 83 % 83 % 97 % 82 % 84 % 87 % 87 % 
Estonia_Tallinn 75 % 77 % 77 % 95 % 73 % 72 % 89 % 87 % 
Estonia_Tartu 83 % 83 % 81 % 94 % 81 % 80 % 90 % 85 % 
Finland_Helsinki 81 % 77 % 77 % 95 % 71 % 74 % 83 % 80 % 
Finland_Tampere 82 % 70 % 69 % 92 % 64 % 63 % 81 % 81 % 
Finland_Turku 84 % 80 % 76 % 95 % 60 % 73 % 83 % 83 % 
France_Lyon 67 % 43 % 70 % 95 % 62 % 75 % 65 % 82 % 
France_Marseille 64 % 36 % 58 % 90 % 57 % 62 % 67 % 81 % 
France_Paris 67 % 45 % 69 % 89 % 61 % 69 % 62 % 81 % 
Germany_Berlin 71 % 69 % 74 % 92 % 49 % 63 % 69 % 83 % 
Germany_Hamburg 79 % 76 % 75 % 94 % 58 % 71 % 68 % 82 % 
Germany_Munich 77 % 72 % 75 % 94 % 59 % 67 % 75 % 81 % 
Greece_Athens 40 % 41 % 51 % 89 % 47 % 46 % 91 % 92 % 
Greece_Patras 38 % 38 % 51 % 91 % 48 % 43 % 94 % 97 % 
Greece_Salonica 41 % 42 % 50 % 91 % 48 % 46 % 94 % 95 % 
Hungary_Budapest 59 % 81 % 86 % 97 % 69 % 77 % 93 % 94 % 
Hungary_Debrecen 60 % 59 % 58 % 98 % 92 % 93 % 82 % 91 % 
Italy_Milan 60 % 58 % 67 % 90 % 52 % 69 % 76 % 69 % 
Italy_Naples 57 % 54 % 60 % 86 % 41 % 56 % 81 % 74 % 
Italy_Rome 55 % 53 % 61 % 93 % 42 % 66 % 80 % 75 % 
Netherlands_Amsterdam 82 % 75 % 80 % 91 % 65 % 69 % 78 % 77 % 
Netherlands_Rotterdam 79 % 74 % 76 % 92 % 68 % 69 % 80 % 77 % 
Netherlands_The Hague 82 % 77 % 83 % 94 % 68 % 68 % 78 % 79 % 
Norway_Bergen 85 % 78 % 88 % 96 % 79 % 82 % 80 % 88 % 
Norway_Oslo 90 % 84 % 87 % 95 % 80 % 85 % 84 % 87 % 
Norway_Trondheim 84 % 78 % 84 % 97 % 72 % 80 % 85 % 88 % 
Poland_Cracow 56 % 64 % 74 % 94 % 70 % 46 % 87 % 84 % 
Poland_Lodz 83 % 81 % 79 % 97 % 57 % 49 % 85 % 77 % 
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Poland_Warsaw 65 % 71 % 63 % 95 % 63 % 67 % 91 % 93 % 
Portugal_Braga 62 % 50 % 61 % 96 % 39 % 61 % 85 % 82 % 
Portugal_Lisbon 62 % 49 % 51 % 92 % 40 % 60 % 89 % 88 % 
Portugal_Porto 67 % 51 % 57 % 94 % 43 % 57 % 89 % 86 % 
Romania_Bucharest 50 % 54 % 63 % 90 % 68 % 50 % 87 % 90 % 
Romania_Cluj-Napoca 47 % 53 % 66 % 92 % 69 % 51 % 85 % 92 % 
Romania_Timisoara 49 % 51 % 64 % 89 % 68 % 46 % 88 % 88 % 
Slovenia_Ljubljana 53 % 51 % 50 % 63 % 37 % 24 % 44 % 48 % 
Slovenia_Maribor 54 % 42 % 54 % 67 % 39 % 31 % 40 % 46 % 
Spain_Barcelona 48 % 47 % 48 % 93 % 33 % 44 % 81 % 82 % 
Spain_Madrid 47 % 53 % 50 % 93 % 39 % 54 % 80 % 80 % 
Spain_Valencia 53 % 51 % 44 % 92 % 36 % 51 % 83 % 83 % 
Sweden_Goteborg 67 % 71 % 74 % 84 % 61 % 64 % 78 % 83 % 
Sweden_Malmo 71 % 72 % 80 % 80 % 61 % 62 % 73 % 80 % 
Sweden_Stockholm 73 % 72 % 73 % 89 % 67 % 70 % 81 % 82 % 
United Kingdom_London 73 % 72 % 72 % 86 % 66 % 70 % 78 % 73 % 
         
Min  26 % 36 % 15 % 63 % 30 % 16 % 40 % 46 % 
Max  91 % 87 % 88 % 99 % 92 % 93 % 98 % 99 % 
Source: own computations based  on data from the World Justice Project. 
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In the data set, all indicators simultaneously satisfy the conditions skewness < 2 and kurtosis < 3.5 
(Dybczyński 1980; Velasco & Verma 1998), which indicates lack of non-normal distribution and lack 
of outliers. 
In the next step, we verified the underlying structure of the data measuring the law enforcement 
concept. As our aim was to construct a composite indicator measuring the level of law enforcement 
in European cities, we performed a data consistency check using data aggregated at the cities level 
(i.e. based on the data presented in Table 18). We analysed the correlation matrix and then we 
conducted a principal component analysis (PCA). 
 
Table 19. Correlation matrix — Law enforcement 
 
q9a q9b q10a q12a q12b q12c q13a q13b 
q9a 1        
q9b 0.855** 1       
q10a 0.808** 0.811** 1      
q12a 0.198 0.302* 0.183 1     
q12b 0.569** 0.664** 0.744** 0.358** 1    
q12c 0.552** 0.564** 0.657** 0.530** 0.765** 1   
q13a 0.010 0.210 0.023 0.573** 0.164 0.065 1  
q13b 0.063 0.171 0.142 0.569** 0.397* 0.191 0.827** 1 
** significant at 0.01, * significant at 0.05. 
Source: own computations based  on data from the World Justice Project. 
 
 
The analysis of the correlation matrix showed that only some variables are correlated positively and 
significantly at either the 0.01 or 0.05 significance level (Table 19). It implied that one-dimensional 
structure of the law enforcement concept may not be confirmed. Then, the results of the PCA show 
that with the chosen set of data, the construction of a one-dimensional composite indicator is not 
valid. It is clearly indicated by the two eigenvalues exceeding 1 and by the fact that the amount of 
variance explained by the first principal component amounts to only 51.7 % (see Table 20). 
70 
 
Nevertheless, the KMO is satisfactory (0.711). The analysis of the pattern of loadings (see Table 20) 
enables us to draw a conclusion about two-dimensional structure of the law enforcement concept. It 
appears that the first principal component is related to variables q9a, q9b, q10a, q12b and q12c, 
whereas the second principal component is associated with variables q21a, q13a and q13b. It seems 
that the first principal component measures the law enforcement with respect to institutions and the 
second principal component measures the law enforcement with respect to actions taken by citizens. 
Therefore, we decided to compute two composites corresponding to two principal components, 
namely Index of Law Enforcement with respect to institutions (ILE-I) and Index of Law 
Enforcement with respect to citizens (ILE-C). 
 
Table 20. PCA — Law enforcement 
Variable Communalities 
Loadings of the 
first PC 
Loadings of the 
second PC 
q9a .786 .801 -.380 
q9b .802 .868 -.222 
q10a .864 .858 -.356 
q12a .671 .560 .598 
q12b .740 .855 -.099 
q12c .673 .813 -.108 
q13a .849 .343 .855 
q13b .841 .427 .811 
KMO 0.711 
Eigenvalues 4.137 2.089.747.468.209.139.134.078 
Variance explained by the first principal component 51.71 % 
Variance explained by the second principal component 26.12 % 
Source: own computations based  on data from the World Justice Project. 
 
Having established the two-dimensional structure of the law enforcement concept, in the following 
step, we aggregated variables into the ILE-I and ILE-C. We use the arithmetic average with equal 
weights. The scores of the ILE-I and ILE-C interpretation are presented in Section 6.2.7 in Table 
39. 
71 
 
To verify if the ILE-I and the ILE-C are statistically well balanced, we calculated the correlation 
coefficients between the variables populating each composite and the composite itself and the 
importance of each variable comprised in the framework (Table 21). As can be seen, the ILE-I is 
very well balanced, which implies equal contribution of the variables the composite. Regarding the 
ILE-C, it is clear that the contribution of the q12a variable is considerably lower compared to the 
contribution of the remaining two variables. 
Table 21. Law enforcement — Variable importance 
Variable Correlation with the 
composite indicator 
Importance (r2 rescaled 
to unity sum) 
ILE-I 
q9a 0.86 0.20 
q9b 0.89 0.21 
q10a 0.92 0.23 
q12b 0.86 0.19 
q12c 0.82 0.18 
ILE-C 
q12a 0.77 0.26 
q13a 0.93 0.38 
q13b 0.92 0.37 
Source: own computations based on data from the World Justice Project. 
 
 
6.2.3. Trust 
 
With respect to trust, we decided to measure generalised trust and institutional trust separately, 
which is in line with the literature. General trust is measured using data from the question: how 
much trust do you have in people living in this country? (q17a). The possible answer categories were: 
a lot, some, a little and no, trust. The level of general trust (GT) in European countries is expressed 
as the percentages of citizens claiming that they have a lot or some trust in people living in the 
country (Table 22). 
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Table 22. Percentages of people who in a given city have a lot or some trust in other people 
City q17a  
 
a lot or some trust in 
people living in the 
country 
Belgium_Antwerp 72 % 
Belgium_Charleroi 56 % 
Belgium_Ghent 76 % 
Bulgaria_Plovdiv 75 % 
Bulgaria_Sofia 65 % 
Bulgaria_Varna 89 % 
Croatia_Rijeka 64 % 
Croatia_Split 57 % 
Croatia_Zagreb 64 % 
Czech Republic_Brno 76 % 
Czech Republic_Ostrava 65 % 
Czech Republic_Prague 64 % 
Denmark_Aarhus 90 % 
Denmark_Copenhagen 90 % 
Denmark_Odense 88 % 
Estonia_Tallinn 69 % 
Estonia_Tartu 77 % 
Finland_Helsinki 91 % 
Finland_Tampere 89 % 
Finland_Turku 89 % 
France_Lyon 57 % 
France_Marseille 52 % 
France_Paris 57 % 
Germany_Berlin 68 % 
Germany_Hamburg 68 % 
Germany_Munich 71 % 
Greece_Athens 77 % 
Greece_Patras 81 % 
Greece_Salonica 82 % 
Hungary_Budapest 89 % 
Hungary_Debrecen 95 % 
Italy_Milan 71 % 
Italy_Naples 57 % 
Italy_Rome 63 % 
Netherlands_Amsterdam 65 % 
Netherlands_Rotterdam 56 % 
Netherlands_The Hague 67 % 
Norway_Bergen 89 % 
Norway_Oslo 85 % 
Norway_Trondheim 87 % 
Poland_Cracow 62 % 
Poland_Lodz 80 % 
Poland_Warsaw 71 % 
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Portugal_Braga 90 % 
Portugal_Lisbon 79 % 
Portugal_Porto 80 % 
Romania_Bucharest 67 % 
Romania_Cluj-Napoca 69 % 
Romania_Timisoara 66 % 
Slovenia_Ljubljana 77 % 
Slovenia_Maribor 76 % 
Spain_Barcelona 80 % 
Spain_Madrid 80 % 
Spain_Valencia 79 % 
Sweden_Goteborg 86 % 
Sweden_Malmo 80 % 
Sweden_Stockholm 88 % 
United Kingdom_London 66 % 
  
Min 52 % 
Max 95 % 
  Source: own computations based on data from the World Justice Project. 
 
 
 
In order to measure institutional trust, four indicators were used. These questions can be answered 
using one of four answer categories: a lot, some, a little, or no, trust. The list of questions that were 
assessed is presented in Table 23. 
Table 23. Questions measuring institutional trust. 
Label Question 
q17b How much trust do you have in officers working in the local government? 
q17c How much trust do you have in officers working in the national government? 
q17d How much trust do you have in the police? 
q17e How much trust do you have in the courts? 
 
In order to assess city-level institutional trust, the percentages of people who in a given city claim to 
have a lot or some trust in a certain institution are computed (see Table 24). 
 
Table 24. Percentages of people who have a lot or some trust in certain institution  
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Belgium_Antwerp 66 % 57 % 69 % 52 % 
Belgium_Charleroi 39 % 33 % 63 % 52 % 
Belgium_Ghent 67 % 61 % 70 % 54 % 
Bulgaria_Plovdiv 35 % 22 % 39 % 33 % 
Bulgaria_Sofia 30 % 20 % 31 % 25 % 
Bulgaria_Varna 54 % 49 % 70 % 63 % 
Croatia_Rijeka 18 % 14 % 46 % 24 % 
Croatia_Split 17 % 10 % 37 % 19 % 
Croatia_Zagreb 19 % 15 % 38 % 23 % 
Czech Republic_Brno 43 % 22 % 58 % 58 % 
Czech Republic_Ostrava 38 % 23 % 59 % 50 % 
Czech Republic_Prague 43 % 26 % 59 % 50 % 
Denmark_Aarhus 65 % 48 % 83 % 84 % 
Denmark_Copenhagen 62 % 51 % 79 % 81 % 
Denmark_Odense 66 % 42 % 83 % 78 % 
Estonia_Tallinn 42 % 42 % 75 % 71 % 
Estonia_Tartu 63 % 50 % 80 % 76 % 
Finland_Helsinki 75 % 71 % 88 % 79 % 
Finland_Tampere 75 % 63 % 91 % 77 % 
Finland_Turku 67 % 63 % 86 % 77 % 
France_Lyon 55 % 40 % 63 % 50 % 
France_Marseille 32 % 24 % 54 % 45 % 
France_Paris 46 % 35 % 59 % 52 % 
Germany_Berlin 37 % 26 % 61 % 56 % 
Germany_Hamburg 40 % 33 % 65 % 61 % 
Germany_Munich 40 % 33 % 62 % 61 % 
Greece_Athens 41 % 34 % 56 % 58 % 
Greece_Patras 57 % 43 % 64 % 71 % 
Greece_Salonica 48 % 35 % 61 % 63 % 
Hungary_Budapest 75 % 64 % 71 % 80 % 
Hungary_Debrecen 89 % 87 % 92 % 92 % 
Italy_Milan 44 % 34 % 77 % 62 % 
Italy_Naples 33 % 30 % 54 % 59 % 
Italy_Rome 31 % 28 % 68 % 63 % 
Netherlands_Amsterdam 49 % 42 % 60 % 66 % 
Netherlands_Rotterdam 46 % 42 % 59 % 64 % 
Netherlands_The Hague 55 % 46 % 64 % 64 % 
Norway_Bergen 77 % 74 % 83 % 82 % 
Norway_Oslo 74 % 73 % 81 % 81 % 
Norway_Trondheim 70 % 68 % 76 % 78 % 
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Poland_Cracow 29 % 18 % 36 % 34 % 
Poland_Lodz 22 % 19 % 50 % 39 % 
Poland_Warsaw 41 % 33 % 52 % 45 % 
Portugal_Braga 54 % 36 % 72 % 52 % 
Portugal_Lisbon 46 % 28 % 71 % 50 % 
Portugal_Porto 45 % 27 % 64 % 48 % 
Romania_Bucharest 39 % 35 % 50 % 42 % 
Romania_Cluj-Napoca 37 % 38 % 47 % 44 % 
Romania_Timisoara 43 % 40 % 53 % 48 % 
Slovenia_Ljubljana 33 % 28 % 23 % 48 % 
Slovenia_Maribor 30 % 17 % 22 % 48 % 
Spain_Barcelona 42 % 25 % 62 % 41 % 
Spain_Madrid 40 % 33 % 66 % 41 % 
Spain_Valencia 46 % 37 % 74 % 50 % 
Sweden_Goteborg 58 % 59 % 75 % 70 % 
Sweden_Malmo 56 % 54 % 75 % 68 % 
Sweden_Stockholm 63 % 62 % 71 % 69 % 
United Kingdom_London 49 % 40 % 59 % 60 % 
     
Min 17 % 10 % 22 % 19 % 
Max 89 % 87 % 92 % 92 % 
Source: own computations based on data from the World Justice Project. 
 
 
In the data set, all trust related indicators simultaneously satisfy the conditions skewness < 2 and 
kurtosis < 3.5 (Dybczyński 1980; Velasco & Verma 1998), which indicates lack of non-normal 
distribution and lack of outliers. 
In the next step, we verified the underlying structure of the data measuring the institutional trust 
concept. As our aim was to construct a composite indicator measuring the level of institutional trust 
in European cities (Index of Institutional Trust 2 (IIT2)), we performed a data consistency check 
using data aggregated at the cities level (i.e. based on the data presented in Table 24). We analysed 
the correlation matrix and then we conducted a principal component analysis (PCA). 
 
Table 25. Correlation matrix — institutional trust 
 
q17b q17c q17d q17e 
 
Correlation with 
the composite 
indicator 
Importance 
(r2 rescaled to 
unity sum) 
q17b 1     0.963 0.26 
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q17c 0.941** 1    0.947 0.25 
q17d 0.819** 0.776** 1   0.907 0.24 
q17e 0.847** 0.827** 0.813** 1  0.931 0.25 
** significant at 0.01, * significant at 0.05. 
Source: own computations based on data from the World Justice Project. 
 
 
The analysis of the correlation matrix showed that all variables are correlated positively (as expected) 
and significantly at the 0.01 significance level ( 
Table 25). The results of the PCA confirm the one-dimensionality of the trust concept (see Table 
26). The KMO amounted to 0.821, the first eigenvalue amounted to 3.513, the first principal 
component explained 87.83 % of the variance observed in the five indicators and all loadings related 
to the first principal component were positive. This implies that one-dimensional structure of the 
trust concept is confirmed. 
Table 26. PCA — Institutional trust 
Variable Communalities 
Loadings of the first PC 
Loadings of the second PC 
q17b .929 .964 
q17c .897 .947 
q17d .823 .907 
q17e .865 .930 
KMO 0.821 
Eigenvalues 3.513 0.256 0.175 0.056 
Variance explained by the first principal component 87.83 % 
Source: own computations based on data from the World Justice Project. 
 
Having established the one-dimensional structure of the trust concept, in the following step, we 
aggregated variables using an arithmetic average with equal nominal weights into the ITT2. The 
scores of the ITT2 and IT are presented in Table 39. 
In the next step, to verify if the IT is statistically well balanced, we calculated the correlation 
coefficients between the variables populating the composite and the composite itself and the 
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importance of each variable comprised in the framework (Table 25). As can be seen, the IT is 
sufficiently well balanced, which implies equal contribution of the variables to the composite. The 
only exception to this reasoning is q17a variable, which contributes slightly less compared to other 
variables populating the framework. 
 
6.2.4. Perception of corruption 
 
In order to construct the Index of Corruption five indicators were used. These questions can be 
answered using one of four answer categories: a lot, some, a little, or no trust. The list of questions 
that were assessed is presented in Table 27. 
 
Table 27. Questions measuring the perception of corruption 
Label Question 
q18a  
How many of the officers working in the national government in [COUNTRY] do you think are 
involved in corrupt practices?  
q18b 
How many of the officers working in the local government do you think are involved in corrupt 
practices? 
q18c 
How many of members of parliament/congress in [COUNTRY] do you think are involved in 
corrupt practices? 
q18d 
How many of judges and magistrates in [COUNTRY] do you think are involved in corrupt 
practices? 
q18e 
How many of the officers working in the police in [COUNTRY] do you think are involved in 
corrupt practices? 
 
In order to assess the city-level corruption, the percentages of people who in a given city claim that a 
lot or some people can be involved in corrupt practice are computed (see Table 28). 
 
Table 28. Percentages of people who in a given city claim that a lot or some people can be involved in 
corrupt practice 
City q18a q18b q18c q18d q18e 
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Belgium_Antwerp 8 % 8 % 27 % 18 % 11 % 
Belgium_Charleroi 25 % 22 % 31 % 18 % 16 % 
Belgium_Ghent 6 % 6 % 20 % 13 % 6 % 
Bulgaria_Plovdiv 63 % 68 % 80 % 55 % 59 % 
Bulgaria_Sofia 69 % 67 % 81 % 76 % 67 % 
Bulgaria_Varna 27 % 27 % 38 % 17 % 11 % 
Croatia_Rijeka 73 % 70 % 71 % 28 % 40 % 
Croatia_Split 73 % 66 % 68 % 38 % 47 % 
Croatia_Zagreb 76 % 73 % 77 % 33 % 48 % 
Czech Republic_Brno 28 % 47 % 65 % 28 % 26 % 
Czech Republic_Ostrava 24 % 46 % 67 % 32 % 27 % 
Czech Republic_Prague 28 % 44 % 63 % 30 % 27 % 
Denmark_Aarhus 7 % 9 % 10 % 9 % 8 % 
Denmark_Copenhagen 6 % 6 % 9 % 5 % 6 % 
Denmark_Odense 7 % 4 % 8 % 6 % 5 % 
Estonia_Tallinn 26 % 26 % 29 % 14 % 11 % 
Estonia_Tartu 17 % 19 % 26 % 14 % 8 % 
Finland_Helsinki 10 % 11 % 21 % 10 % 7 % 
Finland_Tampere 12 % 12 % 26 % 12 % 8 % 
Finland_Turku 13 % 17 % 26 % 10 % 7 % 
France_Lyon 28 % 15 % 37 % 16 % 15 % 
France_Marseille 36 % 36 % 43 % 18 % 22 % 
France_Paris 30 % 23 % 36 % 21 % 20 % 
Germany_Berlin 29 % 25 % 29 % 15 % 11 % 
Germany_Hamburg 26 % 22 % 28 % 15 % 13 % 
Germany_Munich 28 % 24 % 34 % 20 % 16 % 
Greece_Athens 29 % 33 % 58 % 30 % 26 % 
Greece_Patras 24 % 19 % 53 % 26 % 22 % 
Greece_Salonica 29 % 30 % 51 % 27 % 22 % 
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Hungary_Budapest 15 % 11 % 29 % 8 % 17 % 
Hungary_Debrecen 6 % 6 % 15 % 1 % 2 % 
Italy_Milan 27 % 32 % 56 % 27 % 16 % 
Italy_Naples 45 % 49 % 69 % 35 % 31 % 
Italy_Rome 37 % 40 % 62 % 29 % 19 % 
Netherlands_Amsterdam 14 % 14 % 16 % 13 % 12 % 
Netherlands_Rotterdam 11 % 12 % 17 % 10 % 10 % 
Netherlands_The Hague 11 % 12 % 13 % 9 % 10 % 
Norway_Bergen 7 % 9 % 7 % 6 % 7 % 
Norway_Oslo 7 % 8 % 9 % 7 % 8 % 
Norway_Trondheim 7 % 8 % 8 % 8 % 9 % 
Poland_Cracow 76 % 75 % 63 % 34 % 40 % 
Poland_Lodz 77 % 68 % 68 % 16 % 39 % 
Poland_Warsaw 60 % 56 % 58 % 29 % 42 % 
Portugal_Braga 41 % 27 % 50 % 27 % 20 % 
Portugal_Lisbon 37 % 30 % 47 % 30 % 18 % 
Portugal_Porto 43 % 32 % 53 % 35 % 25 % 
Romania_Bucharest 55 % 50 % 53 % 37 % 33 % 
Romania_Cluj-Napoca 54 % 50 % 60 % 32 % 36 % 
Romania_Timisoara 51 % 54 % 61 % 32 % 36 % 
Slovenia_Ljubljana 59 % 59 % 34 % 24 % 65 % 
Slovenia_Maribor 62 % 63 % 41 % 24 % 64 % 
Spain_Barcelona 33 % 29 % 50 % 29 % 19 % 
Spain_Madrid 31 % 28 % 50 % 28 % 19 % 
Spain_Valencia 36 % 33 % 56 % 27 % 18 % 
Sweden_Goteborg 13 % 16 % 20 % 14 % 12 % 
Sweden_Malmo 13 % 12 % 16 % 13 % 12 % 
Sweden_Stockholm 9 % 13 % 14 % 12 % 10 % 
United Kingdom_London 21 % 19 % 31 % 19 % 18 % 
      
Min 6 % 4 % 7 % 1 % 2 % 
Max 77 % 75 % 81 % 76 % 67 % 
Source: own computations based on data from the World Justice Project. 
 
 
In the data set, all indicators simultaneously satisfy the conditions skewness < 2 and kurtosis < 3.5 
(Dybczyński 1980; Velasco & Verma 1998), which indicates lack of non-normal distribution and lack 
of outliers. 
In the next step, we verified the underlying structure of the data measuring the trust concept. As our 
aim was to construct a composite indicator measuring the level of corruption in European cities 
(Index of Corruption (IC)), we performed a data consistency check using data aggregated at the 
cities level (i.e. based on the data presented in Table 28). We analysed the correlation matrix and 
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then we conducted the principal component analysis (PCA). Our criteria for component extraction 
were based on the Keiser-Mayer-Olkin statistic (KMO), which was expected to be above 0.5; the 
Keiser criterion (i.e. only one eigenvalue above 1); the amount of variance explained and the pattern 
of principal component loadings.  
Table 29. Correlation matrix — corruption 
 
q18a q18b q18c q18d q18e  
Correlation with 
the composite 
indicator 
Importance 
(r2 rescaled to 
unity sum) 
q18a 1      0.96 0.21 
q18b 0.959** 1     0.97 0.22 
q18c 0.826** 0.868** 1    0.93 0.20 
q18d 0.736** 0.765** 0.863** 1   0.87 0.18 
q18e 0.887** 0.909** 0.742** 0.776** 1  0.92 0.20 
** significant at 0.01, * significant at 0.05. 
Source: own computations based on data from the World Justice Project. 
 
The analysis of the correlation matrix showed that all variables are correlated positively (as expected) 
and significantly at the 0.01 significance level (Table 29). The results of the PCA confirm the one-
dimensionality of the corruption concept (see Table 30). The KMO amounted to 0.748, the first 
eigenvalue amounted to 4.336, the first principal component explained 82.72 % of the variance 
observed in the five indicators, and all loadings related to the first principal component were 
positive. It implies that one-dimensional structure of the trust concept is confirmed. 
Table 30. PCA — Corruption. 
Variable Communalities Loadings of the first PC 
q18a .600 .949 
q18b .927 .969 
q18c .877 .922 
q18d .799 .886 
q18e .840 .928 
KMO 0.748 
Eigenvalues 4.336 0.373 0.202 0.061 0.027 
Variance explained by the first principal component 86.72 % 
Source: own computations based on data from the World Justice Project. 
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Having established one-dimensional structure of the corruption concept, in the following step, we 
aggregated variables into the IC. To this end, we again employed the arithmetic average with equal 
weights. The scores of the IC are presented in Table 39. 
In the next step, to verify if the IC is statistically well balanced, we calculated the correlation 
coefficients between the variables populating the composite and the composite itself and the 
importance of each variable comprised in the framework (Table 29). As can be seen, the IC is very 
well balanced which implies equal contribution of the variables the composite. 
6.2.5. Perception of paying bribes 
 
In order to construct the Index of Paying Bribes (IPB), five indicators were used. These questions 
can be answered using one out of two answer categories: yes or no. The list of questions that were 
assessed is presented in Table 31. 
Table 31. Questions measuring the perception of paying bribes. 
Label Question 
q36a 
Do people in your neighbourhood have to pay a bribe or other inducements to register their 
ownership title in a piece of land or house? 
q36b 
Do people in your neighbourhood have to pay a bribe or other inducements to obtain a driver’s 
license? 
q36c 
Do people in your neighbourhood have to pay a bribe or other inducements to be admitted to a 
public school? 
q36d 
Do people in your neighbourhood have to pay a bribe or other inducements to be treated in a 
public hospital? 
q36e 
Do people in your neighbourhood have to pay a bribe or other inducements to receive the services 
of the police? 
 
In order to assess the city-level perception of paying bribes, the percentages of people who in a 
given city agree that people in their neighbourhood have to pay a bribe or other inducements are 
computed (see Table 32). 
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Table 32. Percentages of people who in a given city agree that people in their neighbourhood have to pay a 
bribe or other inducements 
City q36a q36b q36c q36d q36e 
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Belgium_Antwerp 2 % 3 % 2 % 1 % 1 % 
Belgium_Charleroi 8 % 10 % 4 % 5 % 5 % 
Belgium_Ghent 4 % 3 % 3 % 2 % 1 % 
Bulgaria_Plovdiv 41 % 55 % 33 % 50 % 30 % 
Bulgaria_Sofia 50 % 62 % 35 % 51 % 35 % 
Bulgaria_Varna 40 % 46 % 18 % 42 % 26 % 
Croatia_Rijeka 42 % 65 % 41 % 23 % 26 % 
Croatia_Split 38 % 53 % 34 % 29 % 20 % 
Croatia_Zagreb 35 % 38 % 28 % 26 % 23 % 
Czech Republic_Brno 8 % 6 % 9 % 13 % 5 % 
Czech Republic_Ostrava 11 % 7 % 10 % 20 % 13 % 
Czech Republic_Prague 7 % 10 % 10 % 16 % 8 % 
Denmark_Aarhus 10 % 10 % 8 % 8 % 9 % 
Denmark_Copenhagen 6 % 5 % 3 % 4 % 5 % 
Denmark_Odense 5 % 1 % 4 % 4 % 4 % 
Estonia_Tallinn 5 % 12 % 12 % 18 % 9 % 
Estonia_Tartu 1 % 4 % 5 % 16 % 7 % 
Finland_Helsinki 11 % 6 % 9 % 8 % 9 % 
Finland_Tampere 11 % 7 % 9 % 8 % 9 % 
Finland_Turku 6 % 5 % 6 % 4 % 8 % 
France_Lyon 1 % 3 % 2 % 2 % 1 % 
France_Marseille 7 % 9 % 6 % 3 % 5 % 
France_Paris 6 % 8 % 5 % 5 % 4 % 
Germany_Berlin 3 % 2 % 2 % 1 % 1 % 
Germany_Hamburg 3 % 2 % 2 % 2 % 3 % 
Germany_Munich 3 % 3 % 2 % 3 % 1 % 
Greece_Athens 48 % 85 % 16 % 49 % 14 % 
Greece_Patras 48 % 73 % 19 % 53 % 16 % 
Greece_Salonica 54 % 87 % 14 % 38 % 17 % 
Hungary_Budapest 0 % 1 % 1 % 40 % 2 % 
Hungary_Debrecen 0 % 0 % 1 % 9 % 0 % 
Italy_Milan 11 % 13 % 10 % 10 % 10 % 
Italy_Naples 24 % 22 % 16 % 19 % 9 % 
Italy_Rome 13 % 14 % 10 % 12 % 8 % 
Netherlands_Amsterdam 6 % 8 % 3 % 2 % 2 % 
Netherlands_Rotterdam 6 % 8 % 4 % 6 % 4 % 
Netherlands_The Hague 5 % 11 % 5 % 4 % 1 % 
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Norway_Bergen 5 % 4 % 4 % 6 % 6 % 
Norway_Oslo 2 % 2 % 2 % 4 % 5 % 
Norway_Trondheim 5 % 4 % 6 % 6 % 6 % 
Poland_Cracow 45 % 39 % 25 % 17 % 19 % 
Poland_Lodz 38 % 34 % 28 % 22 % 22 % 
Poland_Warsaw 30 % 43 % 32 % 11 % 26 % 
Portugal_Braga 25 % 29 % 19 % 14 % 14 % 
Portugal_Lisbon 16 % 12 % 10 % 9 % 9 % 
Portugal_Porto 22 % 41 % 15 % 12 % 14 % 
Romania_Bucharest 34 % 32 % 27 % 29 % 21 % 
Romania_Cluj-Napoca 50 % 33 % 16 % 16 % 20 % 
Romania_Timisoara 44 % 44 % 25 % 18 % 22 % 
Slovenia_Ljubljana 53 % 50 % 25 % 18 % 48 % 
Slovenia_Maribor 54 % 46 % 28 % 23 % 49 % 
Spain_Barcelona 5 % 5 % 3 % 5 % 1 % 
Spain_Madrid 6 % 7 % 5 % 3 % 3 % 
Spain_Valencia 7 % 11 % 5 % 6 % 3 % 
Sweden_Goteborg 4 % 5 % 1 % 3 % 1 % 
Sweden_Malmo 2 % 2 % 0 % 1 % 2 % 
Sweden_Stockholm 3 % 4 % 3 % 3 % 2 % 
United Kingdom_London 7 % 6 % 6 % 5 % 5 % 
      
Min 0 % 0 % 0 % 1 % 0 % 
Max 54 % 87 % 41 % 53 % 49 % 
Source: own computations based on data from the World Justice Project. 
 
In the data set, all indicators simultaneously satisfy the conditions skewness < 2 and kurtosis < 3.5 
(Dybczyński 1980; Velasco & Verma 1998), which indicates lack of non-normal distribution and lack 
of outliers. 
In the next step, we verified the underlying structure of the data measuring the trust concept. As our 
aim was to construct a composite indicator measuring the level of bribing in European cities (Index 
of Paying Bribes (IPB)), we performed  data consistency check using data aggregated at the cities 
level (i.e. based on the data presented in Table 32). We analysed the correlation matrix and then we 
conducted the principal component analysis (PCA). 
 
Table 33. Correlation matrix — Perception of paying bribes 
 
q36a q36b q36c q36d q36e 
 
Correlation with 
the composite 
indicator 
Importance  
(r2 rescaled to 
unity sum) 
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q36a 1      0.97 0.23 
q36b 0.929** 1     0.96 0.22 
q36c 0.856** 0.798** 1    0.89 0.19 
q36d 0.744** 0.805** 0.653** 1   0.84 0.17 
q36e 0.873** 0.748** 0.866** 0.615** 1  0.87 0.19 
** significant at 0.01, * significant at 0.05 
Source: own computations based on data from the World Justice Project. 
 
 
The analysis of the correlation matrix showed that all variables are correlated positively (as expected) 
and significantly at the 0.01 significance level (Table 33). The results of the PCA confirm the one-
dimensionality of the corruption concept (see Table 34). The KMO amounted to 0.801, the first 
eigenvalue amounted to 4.165, the first principal component explained 83.29 % of the variance 
observed in the five indicators, and all loadings related to the first principal component were 
positive. It implies that one-dimensional structure of the paying bribes concept is confirmed. 
 
Table 34. PCA — Index of Paying Bribes 
Variable Communalities Loadings of the first PC 
q36a .937 .968 
q36b .883 .940 
q36c .841 .917 
q36d .691 .831 
q36e .813 .902 
KMO 0.801 
Eigenvalues 4.165 0.468 0.189 0.140 0.039 
Variance explained by the first principal component 83.29 % 
Source: own computations based on data from the World Justice Project. 
 
Having established one-dimensional structure of the paying bribes concept, in the following step, we 
aggregated variables into the IPB. We used an arithmetic average. The scores of the IPB are 
presented in Table 39. 
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In the next step, to verify if the IPB is statistically well balanced, we calculated the correlation 
coefficients between the variables populating the composite and the composite itself and the 
importance of each variable comprised in the framework (Table 33). As can be seen, the IPB is well 
balanced, which implies equal contribution of the variables to the composite. 
 
6.2.6. Local governance 
 
In order to construct the Index of Local Governance six indicators were used. These questions can 
be answered using one out of four answer categories: very well, fairly well, fairly badly and very 
badly. The list of questions that were assessed is presented in Table 35. 
 
Table 35. Questions measuring performance of the local government. 
Label Question 
When talking to people about their local government, we often find important differences in how well local 
authorities perform their duties. Could you please tell us how well or badly you think your local government 
(Metropolitan, Municipal, or District administration) is performing in the following procedures? 
q15a  providing citizens information about the government expenditures  
q15b consulting traditional, civil, and community leaders before making decisions 
q15c 
providing information in plain language about people’s legal rights, so that everybody can 
understand them  
q15d providing effective ways to make complaints about public services 
q15e providing effective ways to handle complaints against local government officials 
q15f responding to people’s concerns about community matters  
 
In order to assess the city-level performance of the local government, the percentages of people who 
in a given city claim that the local government performs very well or fairly well are computed (see 
Table 36). 
 
Table 36. Percentages of people who in a given city claim that the local government performs very well or 
fairly well  
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City q15a q15b q15c q15d q15e q15f 
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Belgium_Antwerp 39 % 37 % 38 % 45 % 32 % 46 % 
Belgium_Charleroi 27 % 38 % 46 % 35 % 30 % 40 % 
Belgium_Ghent 41 % 47 % 49 % 52 % 42 % 53 % 
Bulgaria_Plovdiv 29 % 33 % 30 % 35 % 31 % 19 % 
Bulgaria_Sofia 16 % 15 % 23 % 44 % 19 % 20 % 
Bulgaria_Varna 54 % 59 % 63 % 44 % 35 % 45 % 
Croatia_Rijeka 14 % 23 % 13 % 20 % 12 % 26 % 
Croatia_Split 16 % 23 % 13 % 28 % 23 % 37 % 
Croatia_Zagreb 16 % 26 % 15 % 26 % 22 % 38 % 
Czech Republic_Brno 31 % 20 % 26 % 20 % 18 % 27 % 
Czech Republic_Ostrava 34 % 16 % 34 % 25 % 19 % 25 % 
Czech Republic_Prague 33 % 20 % 30 % 28 % 22 % 31 % 
Denmark_Aarhus 63 % 62 % 43 % 54 % 49 % 49 % 
Denmark_Copenhagen 57 % 64 % 46 % 48 % 44 % 47 % 
Denmark_Odense 68 % 65 % 43 % 54 % 45 % 45 % 
Estonia_Tallinn 29 % 25 % 32 % 35 % 24 % 36 % 
Estonia_Tartu 41 % 44 % 40 % 48 % 34 % 58 % 
Finland_Helsinki 55 % 40 % 39 % 42 % 37 % 39 % 
Finland_Tampere 43 % 32 % 31 % 35 % 28 % 28 % 
Finland_Turku 44 % 31 % 29 % 31 % 32 % 29 % 
France_Lyon 38 % 47 % 47 % 40 % 34 % 46 % 
France_Marseille 25 % 28 % 38 % 23 % 27 % 29 % 
France_Paris 36 % 40 % 49 % 42 % 37 % 45 % 
Germany_Berlin 38 % 32 % 32 % 36 % 28 % 46 % 
Germany_Hamburg 41 % 44 % 32 % 37 % 34 % 49 % 
Germany_Munich 52 % 53 % 43 % 45 % 35 % 58 % 
Greece_Athens 13 % 16 % 14 % 15 % 15 % 17 % 
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Greece_Patras 17 % 24 % 25 % 17 % 22 % 24 % 
Greece_Salonica 25 % 28 % 26 % 28 % 28 % 29 % 
Hungary_Budapest 63 % 66 % 59 % 63 % 63 % 57 % 
Hungary_Debrecen 85 % 88 % 86 % 87 % 83 % 79 % 
Italy_Milan 44 % 42 % 42 % 39 % 34 % 39 % 
Italy_Naples 36 % 30 % 29 % 30 % 28 % 29 % 
Italy_Rome 26 % 27 % 29 % 31 % 25 % 25 % 
Netherlands_Amsterdam 37 % 41 % 46 % 52 % 40 % 40 % 
Netherlands_Rotterdam 32 % 40 % 37 % 52 % 39 % 38 % 
Netherlands_The Hague 40 % 36 % 43 % 52 % 42 % 39 % 
Norway_Bergen 56 % 53 % 49 % 42 % 42 % 43 % 
Norway_Oslo 47 % 48 % 46 % 42 % 40 % 49 % 
Norway_Trondheim 46 % 46 % 41 % 36 % 39 % 49 % 
Poland_Cracow 29 % 8 % 34 % 32 % 16 % 31 % 
Poland_Lodz 29 % 77 % 29 % 38 % 25 % 31 % 
Poland_Warsaw 37 % 31 % 35 % 44 % 42 % 44 % 
Portugal_Braga 52 % 48 % 54 % 57 % 50 % 57 % 
Portugal_Lisbon 41 % 36 % 41 % 44 % 34 % 41 % 
Portugal_Porto 46 % 40 % 46 % 49 % 37 % 48 % 
Romania_Bucharest 28 % 32 % 34 % 33 % 20 % 32 % 
Romania_Cluj-Napoca 31 % 34 % 34 % 35 % 18 % 28 % 
Romania_Timisoara 33 % 38 % 36 % 39 % 19 % 30 % 
Slovenia_Ljubljana 37 % 37 % 49 % 36 % 44 % 28 % 
Slovenia_Maribor 39 % 48 % 49 % 34 % 37 % 28 % 
Spain_Barcelona 40 % 42 % 46 % 49 % 37 % 43 % 
Spain_Madrid 37 % 36 % 38 % 42 % 35 % 37 % 
Spain_Valencia 35 % 34 % 37 % 38 % 34 % 37 % 
Sweden_Goteborg 39 % 35 % 41 % 39 % 29 % 34 % 
Sweden_Malmo 39 % 32 % 38 % 39 % 34 % 38 % 
Sweden_Stockholm 51 % 37 % 46 % 44 % 36 % 38 % 
United Kingdom_London 54 % 52 % 54 % 55 % 48 % 52 % 
       
Min 13 % 8 % 13 % 15 % 12 % 17 % 
Max 85 % 88 % 86 % 87 % 83 % 79 % 
Source: own computations based on data from the World Justice Project. 
 
 
In the data set, all indicators simultaneously satisfy the conditions skewness < 2 and kurtosis < 3.5 
(Dybczyński 1980; Velasco & Verma 1998), which indicates lack of non-normal distribution and lack 
of outliers. 
In the next step, we verified the underlying structure of the data measuring the performance of the 
local government concept. As our aim was to construct a composite indicator measuring the quality 
of the activity performed by the local government in European cities (Index of Local Governance 
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(ILG)), we performed a data consistency check using data aggregated at the cities level (i.e. based on 
the data presented in Table 36). As usual, we analysed the correlation matrix and then we conducted 
the principal component analysis (PCA). 
Table 37. Correlation matrix — local governance 
 
q15a q15b q15c q15d q15e q15f  
Correlation 
with the 
composite 
indicator 
Importance  
(r2 rescaled 
to unity 
sum) 
q15a 1       0.92 0.17 
q15b 0.785** 1      0.89 0.16 
q15c 0.814** 0.730** 1     0.86 0.15 
q15d 0.793** 0.748** 0.811** 1    0.91 0.17 
q15e 0.843** 0.784** 0.839** 0.873** 1   0.94 0.18 
q15f 0.748** 0.714** 0.723** 0.798** 0.786** 1  0.87 0.16 
** significant at 0.01, * significant at 0.05 
Source: own computations based on data from the World Justice Project. 
 
 
The analysis of the correlation matrix showed that all variables are correlated positively (as expected) 
and significantly at the 0.01 significance level (Table 37). The results of the PCA confirm the one-
dimensionality of the corruption concept (see Table 38). The KMO amounted to 0.930, the first 
eigenvalue amounted to 4.934, the first principal component explained 82.23 % of the variance 
observed in the six indicators, and all loadings related to the first principal component were positive. 
It implies that one-dimensional structure of the local governance concept is confirmed. 
 
Table 38. PCA — local governance 
Variable Communalities Loadings of the first PC 
q15a .840 .917 
q15b .763 .874 
q15c .818 .904 
q15d .855 .925 
q15e .891 .944 
q15f .766 .875 
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KMO 0.930 
Eigenvalues 4.934 0.306 0.285 0.192 0.167 0.115 
Variance explained by the first principal component 82.23 % 
Source: own computations based on data from the World Justice Project. 
  
Having established one-dimensional structure of the local governance concept, in the following step, 
we aggregated variables into the ILG. We again used the arithmetic average with equal weights. The 
scores of the ILG are presented in Table 39. 
In the next step, to verify if the ILG is statistically well balanced, we calculated the correlation 
coefficients between the variables populating the composite and the composite itself and the 
importance of each variable comprised in the framework (Table 37). As can be seen, the ILG is very 
well balanced which implies equal contribution of the variables to the composite. 
6.2.7. Uncertainty analyses 
 
In this section we present the results of the uncertainty analysis related to composites constructed 
with the data from the World Justice Project. In Figures 25-36 we present the scores and ranks as 
well as simulated median scores and median ranks associated with the error terms expressed by 5th 
and 95th percentiles presenting the uncertainty related to the estimates. It must be noted, however, 
that presented uncertainty relates to the method of aggregation and weighting scheme, only. 
As can be seen, in general all composite indicators seem to be robust to the two normative 
assumptions related to the construction methods. This robustness is reflected by considerably 
narrow uncertainty intervals (difference between the 5th and 95th percentiles). Although, one can 
easily notice examples of relatively wider uncertainty intervals related to some city estimates (see, for 
example, Budapest and Tartu according to the Index of Bribing), these are singular cases resulting 
mostly from uneven performance of a city with respect to the variables populating the composite. 
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Figure 25. Uncertainty analysis — Index of Law Enforcement related to Institutions scores. 
Source: own computations based  on data from the World Justice Project. 
 
 
 
Figure 26. Uncertainty analysis — Index of Law Enforcement related to institutions ranks. 
Source: own computations based on data from the World Justice Project. 
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Figure 27. Uncertainty analysis — Index of Law Enforcement related to citizens scores. 
Source: own computations based on data from the World Justice Project. 
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Figure 28. Uncertainty analysis — Index of Law Enforcement related to citizens ranks. 
Source: own computations based  on data from the World Justice Project. 
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Figure 29. Uncertainty analysis — Index of Institutional Trust scores. 
Source: own computations based on data from the World Justice Project. 
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Figure 30. Uncertainty analysis — Index of Trust ranks. 
Source: own computations based on data from the World Justice Project. 
 
 
 
 
 
1
5
9
13
17
21
25
29
33
37
41
45
49
53
57
H
u
n
ga
ry
_
D
eb
re
ce
n
N
o
rw
ay
_
B
er
ge
n
F
in
la
n
d
_
H
el
si
n
k
i
N
o
rw
ay
_
O
sl
o
F
in
la
n
d
_
T
am
p
er
e
F
in
la
n
d
_
T
u
rk
u
N
o
rw
ay
_
T
ro
n
d
h
ei
m
H
u
n
ga
ry
_
B
u
d
ap
es
t
D
en
m
ar
k
_
A
ar
h
u
s
D
en
m
ar
k
_
C
o
p
en
h
ag
en
D
en
m
ar
k
_
O
d
en
se
E
st
o
n
ia
_
T
ar
tu
S
w
ed
en
_
S
to
ck
h
o
lm
S
w
ed
en
_
G
o
te
b
o
rg
S
w
ed
en
_
M
al
m
o
B
el
gi
u
m
_
G
h
en
t
B
el
gi
u
m
_
A
n
tw
er
p
B
u
lg
ar
ia
_
V
ar
n
a
G
re
ec
e_
P
at
ra
s
E
st
o
n
ia
_
T
al
lin
n
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s_
T
h
e 
H
ag
u
e
It
al
y_
M
il
an
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s_
A
m
st
er
d
am
P
o
rt
u
ga
l_
B
ra
ga
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s_
R
o
tt
er
d
am
U
n
it
ed
 K
in
gd
o
m
_
L
o
n
d
o
n
F
ra
n
ce
_
L
yo
n
G
re
ec
e_
S
al
o
n
ic
a
S
p
ai
n
_
V
al
en
ci
a
G
er
m
an
y_
H
am
b
u
rg
P
o
rt
u
ga
l_
L
is
b
o
n
G
er
m
an
y_
M
u
n
ic
h
F
ra
n
ce
_
P
ar
is
G
re
ec
e_
A
th
en
s
It
al
y_
R
o
m
e
B
el
gi
u
m
_
C
h
ar
le
ro
i
P
o
rt
u
ga
l_
P
o
rt
o
R
o
m
an
ia
_
T
im
is
o
ar
a
C
ze
ch
 R
ep
u
b
lic
_
B
rn
o
S
p
ai
n
_
M
ad
ri
d
G
er
m
an
y_
B
er
lin
C
ze
ch
 R
ep
u
b
lic
_
P
ra
gu
e
It
al
y_
N
ap
le
s
P
o
la
n
d
_
W
ar
sa
w
C
ze
ch
 R
ep
u
b
lic
_
O
st
ra
v
a
S
p
ai
n
_
B
ar
ce
lo
n
a
R
o
m
an
ia
_
C
lu
j-
N
ap
o
ca
R
o
m
an
ia
_
B
u
ch
ar
es
t
F
ra
n
ce
_
M
ar
se
ill
e
S
lo
v
en
ia
_
L
ju
b
lj
an
a
P
o
la
n
d
_
L
o
d
z
B
u
lg
ar
ia
_
P
lo
v
d
iv
P
o
la
n
d
_
C
ra
co
w
S
lo
v
en
ia
_
M
ar
ib
o
r
B
u
lg
ar
ia
_
S
o
fi
a
C
ro
at
ia
_
R
ij
ek
a
C
ro
at
ia
_
Z
ag
re
b
C
ro
at
ia
_
S
p
lit
th
e 
hi
gh
er
, 
th
e 
be
tt
er
 
reference IT - ranks
median simulated IT - ranks
95 
 
 
Figure 31. Uncertainty analysis — Index of Corruption scores. 
Source: own computations based on data from the World Justice Project. 
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Figure 32. Uncertainty analysis — Index of Corruption ranks. 
Source: own computations based on data from the World Justice Project. 
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Figure 33. Uncertainty analysis — Index of Paying Bribes scores. 
Source: own computations based on data from the World Justice Project. 
 
 
 
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
B
u
lg
ar
ia
_
S
o
fi
a
G
re
ec
e_
A
th
en
s
B
u
lg
ar
ia
_
P
lo
v
d
iv
G
re
ec
e_
S
al
o
n
ic
a
G
re
ec
e_
P
at
ra
s
S
lo
v
en
ia
_
M
ar
ib
o
r
C
ro
at
ia
_
R
ij
ek
a
S
lo
v
en
ia
_
L
ju
b
lj
an
a
C
ro
at
ia
_
S
p
lit
B
u
lg
ar
ia
_
V
ar
n
a
R
o
m
an
ia
_
T
im
is
o
ar
a
C
ro
at
ia
_
Z
ag
re
b
P
o
la
n
d
_
C
ra
co
w
R
o
m
an
ia
_
B
u
ch
ar
es
t
P
o
la
n
d
_
L
o
d
z
P
o
la
n
d
_
W
ar
sa
w
R
o
m
an
ia
_
C
lu
j-
N
ap
o
ca
P
o
rt
u
ga
l_
P
o
rt
o
P
o
rt
u
ga
l_
B
ra
ga
It
al
y_
N
ap
le
s
C
ze
ch
 R
ep
u
b
lic
_
O
st
ra
v
a
It
al
y_
R
o
m
e
E
st
o
n
ia
_
T
al
lin
n
P
o
rt
u
ga
l_
L
is
b
o
n
It
al
y_
M
il
an
C
ze
ch
 R
ep
u
b
lic
_
P
ra
gu
e
D
en
m
ar
k
_
A
ar
h
u
s
F
in
la
n
d
_
H
el
si
n
k
i
F
in
la
n
d
_
T
am
p
er
e
H
u
n
ga
ry
_
B
u
d
ap
es
t
C
ze
ch
 R
ep
u
b
lic
_
B
rn
o
E
st
o
n
ia
_
T
ar
tu
S
p
ai
n
_
V
al
en
ci
a
B
el
gi
u
m
_
C
h
ar
le
ro
i
F
ra
n
ce
_
M
ar
se
ill
e
F
in
la
n
d
_
T
u
rk
u
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s_
R
o
tt
er
d
am
N
o
rw
ay
_
T
ro
n
d
h
ei
m
U
n
it
ed
 K
in
gd
o
m
_
L
o
n
d
o
n
F
ra
n
ce
_
P
ar
is
N
o
rw
ay
_
B
er
ge
n
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s_
T
h
e 
H
ag
u
e
S
p
ai
n
_
M
ad
ri
d
D
en
m
ar
k
_
C
o
p
en
h
ag
en
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s_
A
m
st
er
d
am
S
p
ai
n
_
B
ar
ce
lo
n
a
D
en
m
ar
k
_
O
d
en
se
N
o
rw
ay
_
O
sl
o
S
w
ed
en
_
S
to
ck
h
o
lm
S
w
ed
en
_
G
o
te
b
o
rg
B
el
gi
u
m
_
G
h
en
t
G
er
m
an
y_
H
am
b
u
rg
G
er
m
an
y_
M
u
n
ic
h
H
u
n
ga
ry
_
D
eb
re
ce
n
B
el
gi
u
m
_
A
n
tw
er
p
G
er
m
an
y_
B
er
lin
F
ra
n
ce
_
L
yo
n
S
w
ed
en
_
M
al
m
o
th
e 
hi
gh
er
, 
th
e 
be
tt
er
 
reference IPB - scores
median simulated IPB - scores
98 
 
 
Figure 34. Uncertainty analysis — Index of Paying Bribes ranks. 
Source: own computations based on data from the World Justice Project. 
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Figure 35. Uncertainty analysis — Index of Local Governance scores. 
Source: own computations based on data from the World Justice Project. 
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Figure 36. Uncertainty analysis — Index of Local Governance ranks. 
Source: own computations based on data from the World Justice Project. 
 
 
6.2.8. European cities in the perspective related to the trust and quality of 
governance 
 
In order to present situation of the European cities with respect to indexes related to perception of 
law enforcement, trust, corruption, bribing and local governance globally in this section we present 
all constructed composites based on data from the World Justice Project (Table 39 and Figure 37- 
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Figure 43). In addition, we make an attempt to classify the cities into homogenous groups with 
respect to the composites. 
 
Table 39. Performance of the European cities according to the ILE-I, ILE-C, GT, IIT2, IC, IPB and ILG 
city ILE-I ILE-C GT ITT2 IC IPB ILG 
Belgium_Antwerp 0.635 0.829 0.717 0.610 0.144 0.019 0.395 
Belgium_Charleroi 0.636 0.784 0.563 0.465 0.222 0.063 0.361 
Belgium_Ghent 0.677 0.839 0.760 0.629 0.100 0.025 0.474 
Bulgaria_Plovdiv 0.417 0.865 0.753 0.324 0.649 0.419 0.294 
Bulgaria_Sofia 0.386 0.783 0.648 0.266 0.721 0.465 0.229 
Bulgaria_Varna 0.648 0.980 0.888 0.591 0.242 0.344 0.502 
Croatia_Rijeka 0.325 0.860 0.640 0.256 0.565 0.395 0.179 
Croatia_Split 0.372 0.841 0.573 0.206 0.580 0.347 0.231 
Croatia_Zagreb 0.381 0.863 0.641 0.238 0.611 0.301 0.239 
Czech Republic_Brno 0.581 0.881 0.757 0.451 0.387 0.081 0.237 
Czech Republic_Ostrava 0.501 0.911 0.652 0.428 0.388 0.124 0.256 
Czech Republic_Prague 0.538 0.862 0.644 0.442 0.382 0.105 0.272 
Denmark_Aarhus 0.842 0.876 0.904 0.697 0.085 0.088 0.536 
Denmark_Copenhagen 0.848 0.922 0.897 0.681 0.064 0.047 0.510 
Denmark_Odense 0.845 0.906 0.877 0.674 0.059 0.035 0.533 
Estonia_Tallinn 0.747 0.903 0.695 0.574 0.213 0.112 0.300 
Estonia_Tartu 0.815 0.897 0.766 0.670 0.166 0.066 0.442 
Finland_Helsinki 0.759 0.859 0.906 0.781 0.117 0.088 0.420 
Finland_Tampere 0.695 0.847 0.894 0.765 0.137 0.087 0.327 
Finland_Turku 0.745 0.870 0.890 0.734 0.143 0.060 0.326 
France_Lyon 0.636 0.808 0.575 0.520 0.222 0.017 0.420 
France_Marseille 0.554 0.794 0.519 0.386 0.311 0.060 0.284 
France_Paris 0.621 0.773 0.574 0.479 0.259 0.054 0.413 
Germany_Berlin 0.652 0.813 0.679 0.449 0.218 0.017 0.354 
Germany_Hamburg 0.718 0.812 0.684 0.500 0.208 0.024 0.395 
Germany_Munich 0.698 0.832 0.713 0.489 0.242 0.022 0.477 
Greece_Athens 0.452 0.907 0.770 0.474 0.352 0.423 0.151 
Greece_Patras 0.436 0.941 0.814 0.588 0.285 0.419 0.215 
Greece_Salonica 0.455 0.934 0.817 0.518 0.320 0.419 0.273 
Hungary_Budapest 0.744 0.945 0.893 0.726 0.160 0.087 0.618 
Hungary_Debrecen 0.725 0.903 0.953 0.899 0.059 0.021 0.845 
Italy_Milan 0.610 0.782 0.711 0.543 0.317 0.109 0.400 
Italy_Naples 0.536 0.803 0.572 0.441 0.458 0.181 0.302 
Italy_Rome 0.554 0.826 0.630 0.474 0.374 0.113 0.269 
Netherlands_Amsterdam 0.741 0.818 0.647 0.540 0.136 0.042 0.428 
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Netherlands_Rotterdam 0.733 0.831 0.565 0.526 0.120 0.056 0.396 
Netherlands_The Hague 0.758 0.835 0.671 0.574 0.108 0.051 0.421 
Norway_Bergen 0.822 0.881 0.895 0.791 0.071 0.052 0.474 
Norway_Oslo 0.851 0.885 0.854 0.773 0.077 0.031 0.453 
Norway_Trondheim 0.796 0.899 0.870 0.730 0.080 0.056 0.429 
Poland_Cracow 0.619 0.882 0.617 0.294 0.576 0.292 0.251 
Poland_Lodz 0.699 0.867 0.799 0.325 0.534 0.287 0.379 
Poland_Warsaw 0.657 0.929 0.714 0.430 0.488 0.283 0.389 
Portugal_Braga 0.548 0.877 0.901 0.536 0.328 0.204 0.530 
Portugal_Lisbon 0.524 0.898 0.795 0.490 0.322 0.111 0.393 
Portugal_Porto 0.549 0.899 0.798 0.461 0.376 0.207 0.443 
Romania_Bucharest 0.570 0.891 0.670 0.412 0.455 0.288 0.297 
Romania_Cluj-Napoca 0.571 0.896 0.695 0.416 0.461 0.270 0.300 
Romania_Timisoara 0.558 0.885 0.662 0.460 0.467 0.307 0.324 
Slovenia_Ljubljana 0.432 0.516 0.768 0.328 0.481 0.388 0.385 
Slovenia_Maribor 0.440 0.508 0.764 0.292 0.507 0.399 0.392 
Spain_Barcelona 0.441 0.857 0.803 0.426 0.321 0.036 0.429 
Spain_Madrid 0.485 0.846 0.800 0.451 0.312 0.049 0.374 
Spain_Valencia 0.468 0.862 0.795 0.517 0.339 0.065 0.356 
Sweden_Goteborg 0.676 0.816 0.860 0.655 0.151 0.028 0.361 
Sweden_Malmo 0.693 0.778 0.803 0.634 0.131 0.014 0.365 
Sweden_Stockholm 0.709 0.842 0.880 0.664 0.114 0.030 0.421 
United Kingdom_London 0.707 0.790 0.660 0.521 0.217 0.056 0.526 
Source: own computations based on data from the World Justice Project. 
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Figure 37. Index of Law Enforcement with respect to institutions. 
Source: own computations based on data from the World Justice Project. 
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Figure 38. Index of Law Enforcement with respect to citizens. 
Source: own computations based on data from the World Justice Project. 
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Figure 39. Generalised trust. 
Source: own computations based on data from the World Justice Project. 
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Figure 40. Index of Institutional Trust. 
Source: own computations based on data from the World Justice Project. 
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Figure 41. Index of Corruption. 
Source: own computations based on data from the World Justice Project. 
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
Bulgaria_Sofia
Bulgaria_Plovdiv
Croatia_Zagreb
Croatia_Split
Poland_Cracow
Croatia_Rijeka
Poland_Lodz
Slovenia_Maribor
Poland_Warsaw
Slovenia_Ljubljana
Romania_Timisoara
Romania_Cluj-Napoca
Italy_Naples
Romania_Bucharest
Czech Republic_Ostrava
Czech Republic_Brno
Czech Republic_Prague
Portugal_Porto
Italy_Rome
Greece_Athens
Spain_Valencia
Portugal_Braga
Portugal_Lisbon
Spain_Barcelona
Greece_Salonica
Italy_Milan
Spain_Madrid
France_Marseille
Greece_Patras
France_Paris
Germany_Munich
Bulgaria_Varna
Belgium_Charleroi
France_Lyon
Germany_Berlin
United Kingdom_London
Estonia_Tallinn
Germany_Hamburg
Estonia_Tartu
Hungary_Budapest
Sweden_Goteborg
Belgium_Antwerp
Finland_Turku
Finland_Tampere
Netherlands_Amsterdam
Sweden_Malmo
Netherlands_Rotterdam
Finland_Helsinki
Sweden_Stockholm
Netherlands_The Hague
Belgium_Ghent
Denmark_Aarhus
Norway_Trondheim
Norway_Oslo
Norway_Bergen
Denmark_Copenhagen
Denmark_Odense
Hungary_Debrecen
Perception of  corruption 
108 
 
 
 
 
Figure 42. Index of Bribing. 
Source: own computations based on data from the World Justice Project. 
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Figure 43. Index of Local Governance performance. 
Source: own computations based on data from the World Justice Project. 
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In Table 40, we present descriptive statistics for all composites – ILE-I, ILE-C, GT, IIT2, IC, IPB 
and ILG. The theoretical range of all composites is [0, 1]. The most diversified indices are IIT2, IC 
and the ILG. The least diversified indices are GT, IPB and the ILE-C. We do not present the means 
because the presented composites are not directly comparable. However, from the analysis of 
skewness coefficient, we can see the most skewed (and negatively skewed) is ILE-C. It implies that 
most cities score below the average score of the ILE-C. Other negatively skewed composites are the 
ILE-I and GT but in these cases the strength of the skewness is negligible. In addition, it must be 
noted that IPB and ILG are moderately positively skewed which means that most cities score higher 
than the average score of IPB and ILG, respectively. 
Additionally, in Table 41 we see that the constructed composites are mostly significantly correlated. 
As expected, the correlation between IPB and IC and other composites — due to the orientation — 
is negative. Then, the insignificant correlations or the weakest observed correlations we observe 
mostly between ILE-C and other composites, implying that if we want to create a higher order 
composite ILE-C should be excluded as probably measuring slightly different phenomenon than 
other composites. 
 
Table 40. Descriptive statistics related to the ILE-I, ILE-C, GT, IIT2, IC, IPB and ILG 
Index Minimum Maximum Range Skewness 
ILE-I 0.33 0.85 0.53 -0.176 
ILE-C 0.51 0.98 0.47 -2.584 
GT 0.52 0.95 0.43 -0.076 
IIT2 0.21 0.90 0.69 0.146 
IC 0.06 0.72 0.66 0.531 
IPB 0.01 0.47 0.45 0.891 
ILG 0.15 0.85 0.69 1.009 
Source: own computations based on data from the World Justice Project. 
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Table 41. Correlation matrix — ILE-I, ILE-C, GT, IIT2, IC, IPB and ILG 
  ILE-I ILE-C GT IIT2 IC IPB ILG 
ILE-I 1.000 
      
ILE-C 0.233 1.000 
     
GT 0.378** 0.284* 1.000 
    
IIT2 0.772** 0.333* 0.677** 1.000 
   
IC -0.809** -0.187 -0.462** -0.893** 1.000 
  
IPB -0.680** -0.061 -0.123 -0.607** 0.776** 1.000 
 
ILG 0.617** 0.058 0.514** 0.633** -0.615** -0.508** 1.000 
** significant at 0.01, * significant at 0.05. 
Source: own computations based on data from the World Justice Project. 
 
To establish if it is possible to distinguish the groups of cities scoring always the best or always the 
worst, the K-mean clustering method (Magidson 2002) was applied. Because final grouping may 
depend on the choice of the classification method, we also performed classification with the 
hierarchical clustering with Ward’s method and squared Euclidean distance. The obtained results 
were in 93 % cases (54 out of 58) overlapping, implying that the classification results are robust for 
the classification methods used. The classification results are presented in Figure 44 and in Table 42. 
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Figure 44. Classification of European cities with respect to ILE-I, ILE-C, GT, IIT2, IC, IPB and 
ILG 
Source: own computations based on data from the World Justice Project. 
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Table 42. Classification of the European cities with respect to ILE-I, ILE-C, GT, IIT2, IC, IPB and ILG 
 Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 
City Plovdiv (BG) 
Sofia (BG) 
Rijeka (HR) 
Split (HR) 
Zagreb (HR) 
Cracow (PL) 
Ljubljana (SI) 
Maribor (SI) 
 
 
Antwerp (BE) 
Charleroi (BE) 
Ghent (BE) 
Tallinn (EE) 
Lyon (FR) 
Paris (FR) 
Berlin (DE) 
Hamburg (DE) 
Munich (DE) 
Milan (IT) 
Amsterdam (NL) 
Rotterdam (NL) 
The Hague (NL) 
Malmo (SE) 
London (UK) 
Aarhus (DK) 
Copenhagen (DK) 
Odense (DK) 
Tartu (EE) 
Helsinki (FI) 
Tampere (FI) 
Turku (FI) 
Budapest (HU) 
Debrecen (HU) 
Bergen (NO) 
Oslo (NO) 
Trondheim (NO) 
Goteborg (SE) 
Stockholm (SE) 
 
 
Varna (BG) 
Brno (CZ) 
Ostrava (CZ) 
Prague (CZ) 
Marseille (FR) 
Athens (GR) 
Patras (GR) 
Salonica (GR) 
Rome (IT) 
Naples (IT) 
Lodz (PL) 
Warsaw (PL) 
Braga (PT) 
Lisbon (PT) 
Porto (PT) 
Bucharest (RO) 
Cluj-Napoca (RO) 
Timisoara (RO) 
Barcelona (ES) 
Madrid (ES) 
Valencia (ES) 
ILE-I 0.421* .684 0.777** .539 
ILE-C 0.765* .815 0.882** 0.883** 
GT .676 0.668* 0.881** .738 
IIT2 0.275* .537 0.731** .463 
IC 0.586* .190 0.106** .376 
IPB 0.375* 0.045** .055 .208 
ILG 0.275* .408 0.478** .332 
* the worst value; ** the best value 
Source: own computations based on data from the World Justice Project. 
 
 
We recall that the classification presented above was conducted with respect to seven criteria. In 
general, the four obtained city groupings differ significantly with respect to each of them. Detailed 
results of the comparison are presented in Table 42 ;group means was conducted using the Welch 
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test (a counterpart of the ANOVA when the homogeneity of variance cannot be assumed) and the 
Gomes-Howell test for post-hoc multiple comparisons are presented in the Appendix. 
With regard to the group profiles, group 1 consists of cities that on average score the worst. This 
group comprises all Croatian and Slovenian cities and two out of three Bulgarian cities (Plovdiv and 
Sofia) and one Polish city (Cracow) included in the analysis. Not one Romanian city belongs to this 
group. This is an interesting finding because it is commonly found that Romanian and Bulgarian 
NUTS 1 and/or NUTS 2 regions or Romania and Bulgaria often perform similarly with respect to 
economic or social outcomes (see, for example, Annoni et al. 2012; Annoni & Weziak-Bialowolska 
2014; Charron et al. 2014a; Weziak-Bialowolska & Dijkstra 2014; Weziak-Bialowolska 2014). 
The best scoring group is Group 3. It included cities that on average score the best (in six out of 
seven analysed composites). This group comprises all Danish, Finish and Norwegian cities included 
in the analysis, one Estonian (Tartu), two Swedish (Goteborg and Stockholm) and two Hungarian 
(Budapest and Debrecen) cities. 
Group 2 is on average the second best scoring group — it scores the second best in five out of 
seven analysed composites. However, this group scores the best with respect to the perception of 
paying bribes bribing — next to Group 3 and the worst with respect to general trust. This group 
comprises all Belgian, German, Dutch, and British cities included in the analysis and two Finish 
(Tampere and Turku), two French (Lyon and Paris) and one Italian (Milan), one Estonian (Tallinn) 
and one Swedish (Malmo) cities. 
The second worst scoring group is Group 4. It scores the second worst with respect to four out of 
seven composites. However, this group appears also to be the best with respect to the law 
enforcement towards citizens, and the second best with respect to generalised trust. All Czech, 
Greek, Portuguese, Romanian and Spanish cities included in the analysis belong to this group, 
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together with two Polish cities (Lodz and Warsaw), one Bulgarian (Varna), one French (Marseille), 
and two Italian (Rome and Naples) cities. 
 
 
Figure 45. Map - classification of the European cities with respect to the ILE-I, ILE-C, IGT, IIT, IC, 
IPB and ILG (with the population size indicated) 
Note: group 1 -green; group 2 – blue; group 3 - yellow; group 4 - orange; 
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generalised trust. These are mainly Western European cities. Second worst scoring group performs 
also the best with respect to the law enforcement towards citizens, and the second best with respect 
to the generalised trust. This group includes Eastern European but also all Southern European cities. 
These results show that traditional diversification with respect to geographical location to Western, 
Northern, Southern and Western Europe is not necessarily correct while examining the institutions 
and local governance in city perspectives. Although the Western European and Northern European 
cities are well distinguishable and associated with the most favourable institutional conditions, cities 
in the Southern and Eastern part of Europe cannot be classified unequivocally based only on the 
geographical location.  
 
7. Remarks on the generalised trust in Poland, Polish cities and Polish small towns, 
suburbs and rural areas 
 
The generalised trust occurs in all three approaches are presented in this report. Therefore, it gives 
us an opportunity to compare the results obtained. However, this opportunity applies only to 
Poland, Polish cities and Polish small towns, suburbs and rural areas, which will be of interest in this 
section. 
In Table 43, we collected all results related to the generalised trust presented in his report for Poland 
and we supplemented them with results based on two additional surveys, the European Social 
Surveys (ESS) and World Value Surveys (WVS). Both these surveys comprise questions on the 
generalised trust. We compare them by taking into account methodological differences in 
formulating question and answers as well as considering the area of application, i.e. country versus 
sub-national level of application. 
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What can be concluded from the analysis of Table 43 is as follows. First, the level of generalised 
trust in Poland measured based on the results from the EQLS and the ESS is similar, although the 
measurement scales differ slightly. Second, the level of the generalised trust measured in the Social 
Diagnosis and the WVS differ considerably, although the formulation of questions as well as 
answers are similar in both surveys. Third, the levels of generalised trust in the three biggest Polish 
cities (Warsaw, Cracow, Lodz) according to the data from the Justice Project is substantially higher 
than their counterparts calculated based on data from the Social Diagnosis. The differences do not 
seem to be negligible even when the dissimilarities in the wording of answers are taken into account. 
To sum up, to decide which estimates are more accurate definitely requires more profound research. 
Unfortunately, this is beyond the scope of this project at the current stage. 
Table 43. Level of generalised trust in areas in Poland.  
Survey Area Level (scale) 
EQLS Country 4.79 [1-10] 
EQLS Cities 4.64 [1-10] 
EQLS Suburbs, small towns, rural areas 4.86 [1-10] 
 
Social Diagnosis Country 
12.8 % (percentage of people who agree that 
‘You can trust most people’) 
Social Diagnosis Warsaw 
18.3 % (percentage of people who agree that 
‘You can trust most people’) 
Social Diagnosis The lowest scoring city — Walbrzych 
7.0 % (percentage of people who agree that 
‘You can trust most people’) 
Social Diagnosis 
The highest scoring city — Wroclaw 
and Torun 
20.3 % (percentage of people who agree that 
‘You can trust most people’) 
Social Diagnosis Cracow 
19.6 % (percentage of people who agree that 
‘You can trust most people’) 
Social  Lodz 
9.5 % (percentage of people who agree that 
‘You can trust most people’) 
 
WJP Cracow 
62 % (percentage of people who have a lot or 
some trust in people leaving in the country) 
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WJP Lodz 
80 % (percentage of people who have a lot or 
some trust in people leaving in the country) 
WJP Warsaw 
71 % (percentage of people who have a lot or 
some trust in people leaving in the country) 
 
European Social 
Survey wave 6 
(2012) 
Country  4.09 [0-10] 
 
World Value 
Survey wave 6 
(2010-2014) 
Country  
22.8 % (percentage of people who agree that 
‘Most people can be trusted’) 
Source: own computations based on data from the World Justice Project, Social Diagnosis, European Quality of Life 
Survey, European Social Survey and World Value Survey. 
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Appendix 
 
 
Table A1. Sample size, number of ‘don’t know’ answers and missing data per country — general trust, trust in institutions and quality of 
public service in the EQLS 
C
o
u
n
tr
y 
sa
m
p
le
 
si
z
e
 
general trust Q28a Q28b Q28c Q28d Q28e 
 
Q28f 
 
don’t 
know 
refusal 
don’t 
know 
refusal 
don’t 
know 
refusal 
don’t 
know 
refusal 
don’t 
know 
refusal 
don’t 
know 
refusal 
don’t 
know 
refusal 
AT 1032 1 0 10 1 13 1 13 1 6 2 6 2 11 1 
BE 1013 4 0 25 0 11 0 11 0 9 0 20 0 14 0 
BG 1000 11 6 13 17 48 14 39 13 20 14 17 19 30 13 
CY 1006 1 0 27 2 32 2 39 2 18 3 24 4 26 2 
CZ 1012 0 0 19 7 14 6 5 3 6 4 14 7 14 4 
DE 3055 8 4 61 16 47 13 18 11 23 8 33 18 50 12 
DK 1024 1 1 13 1 25 1 7 0 6 0 12 3 17 0 
EE 1002 4 0 27 3 72 2 23 0 22 0 20 2 34 1 
ES 1512 5 1 71 5 41 2 42 4 13 2 26 4 20 2 
FI 1020 2 0 8 0 7 1 7 0 3 0 5 1 14 0 
FR 2270 14 2 50 3 12 3 11 3 7 5 13 5 10 3 
GR 1004 0 4 10 2 25 0 20 0 5 1 9 7 9 4 
HR 1001 14 2 17 7 16 6 11 3 12 2 18 6 17 6 
HU 1024 4 1 18 14 29 5 14 5 17 4 18 12 25 4 
IE 1051 1 0 21 1 23 0 9 0 4 1 10 0 33 0 
IS 1000 5 0 5 2 6 0 7 1 1 0 4 2 12 3 
IT 2250 6 3 21 12 25 7 30 3 13 3 12 16 26 7 
LU 1005 5 2 100 4 50 2 19 2 13 0 56 1 35 3 
LV 1009 6 0 23 5 79 2 23 1 47 0 23 2 39 2 
MT 1001 7 2 86 11 95 6 62 3 24 3 42 11 56 6 
NL 1008 1 0 31 1 14 0 12 0 6 0 11 1 24 1 
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PL 2262 8 1 63 4 91 1 46 2 39 5 40 6 64 6 
PT 1013 4 0 36 0 39 0 32 0 9 0 25 0 21 0 
RO 1542 27 0 33 4 86 2 64 2 41 0 36 5 44 3 
SE 1007 4 0 11 3 17 0 12 1 7 0 17 1 17 1 
SI 1008 2 1 13 1 14 0 9 0 20 0 12 0 11 1 
SK 1000 5 9 10 6 22 5 19 5 11 4 18 8 19 9 
UK 2252 18 2 63 2 65 1 28 2 17 1 30 2 43 1 
 
  
Q53a Q53b Q53c Q53d Q53e Q53f Q53g 
 
sample 
size 
don’t 
know 
refusal 
don’t 
know 
refusal 
don’t 
know 
refusal 
don’t 
know 
refusal 
don’t 
know 
refusal 
don’t 
know 
refusal 
don’t 
know 
refusal 
AT 1032 8 1 40 2 35 1 197 2 234 1 169 1 60 2 
BE 1013 9 0 41 1 72 0 347 2 238 2 259 2 131 1 
BG 1000 24 11 156 12 76 10 225 13 266 15 485 17 109 17 
CY 1006 34 0 77 0 183 0 325 0 482 0 323 1 109 0 
CZ 1012 1 1 48 0 14 1 114 2 186 4 245 3 65 0 
DE 3055 14 1 144 8 70 7 567 31 875 40 970 52 181 15 
DK 1024 16 1 81 0 64 0 214 2 220 2 239 1 129 3 
EE 1002 31 1 104 2 76 0 467 0 514 1 524 0 116 1 
ES 1512 12 1 127 1 94 2 519 4 497 5 505 5 202 3 
FI 1020 7 0 25 0 29 1 171 5 143 6 190 2 90 1 
FR 2270 15 0 80 1 196 0 723 0 529 0 428 4 160 1 
GR 1004 8 1 62 1 39 1 246 20 309 20 333 25 44 0 
HR 1001 18 0 42 0 56 1 124 2 128 2 218 4 48 0 
HU 1024 7 1 103 6 94 4 373 9 417 10 371 8 109 7 
IE 1051 18 0 52 1 56 0 447 1 376 0 336 0 281 0 
IS 1000 8 0 19 0 76 1 198 2 200 1 329 1 201 6 
IT 2250 14 3 98 5 180 4 351 8 525 9 411 5 120 5 
LU 1005 23 1 158 1 73 0 443 1 457 1 580 2 280 1 
LV 1009 42 1 165 0 70 0 401 3 551 6 421 5 116 0 
MT 1001 20 0 78 0 126 0 381 0 383 0 479 0 308 0 
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NL 1008 6 0 89 2 103 0 490 1 230 1 238 0 189 1 
PL 2262 35 2 192 2 130 1 486 3 777 7 709 4 205 2 
PT 1013 8 0 84 0 60 0 264 0 289 1 340 0 93 0 
RO 1542 37 1 102 1 199 2 543 1 650 5 629 7 582 7 
SE 1007 7 0 77 0 38 0 278 0 273 1 260 0 176 1 
SI 1008 7 0 38 1 78 2 193 6 187 6 295 4 52 1 
SK 1000 15 1 122 4 50 1 207 6 292 9 283 7 82 14 
UK 2252 25 2 260 2 249 2 1344 3 1008 2 886 2 597 3 
 
 
Table A2. Sample size, number of ‘don’t know’ answers and missing data per city — general trust and free-riding in the Social Diagnosis 
survey. 
City 
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Bialystok 402 33 1 22 2 21 3 25 3 30 3 33 3 
Bielsko-Biala 382 32 0 25 0 21 0 22 0 34 0 24 0 
Bydgoszcz 515 44 4 42 2 24 2 31 2 33 2 39 2 
Cracow 1191 102 1 45 6 21 2 36 4 37 2 27 3 
Czestochowa 324 12 0 15 0 12 0 13 0 16 0 25 0 
Gdansk 707 64 2 41 0 29 0 47 0 47 0 51 0 
Gdynia 266 20 0 21 0 15 0 17 0 21 0 21 0 
Gliwice 239 11 0 13 4 8 1 8 1 14 1 14 1 
Gorzow Wielkopolski 229 18 0 20 0 14 0 13 0 16 0 15 0 
Jaworzno 305 16 0 15 0 13 0 13 0 13 0 14 0 
Katowice 482 47 3 29 0 20 0 24 0 24 0 30 0 
Kielce 293 30 0 29 0 21 0 36 0 28 0 27 0 
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Lodz 1194 106 2 49 2 33 2 47 2 45 2 54 2 
Lublin 493 36 0 24 2 25 5 23 2 28 2 33 2 
Olsztyn 282 37 0 17 2 16 2 16 2 21 2 24 2 
Opole 169 8 0 5 0 6 0 9 0 11 0 10 0 
Poznan 649 43 4 35 6 31 7 27 7 37 7 45 7 
Radom 376 27 2 23 0 18 1 29 1 24 1 30 1 
Ruda Slaska 215 15 0 31 2 19 2 20 2 28 2 32 2 
Sosnowiec 326 45 1 39 0 25 0 39 2 30 0 29 0 
Szczecin 586 58 0 28 0 23 0 28 0 37 0 51 0 
Torun 295 16 3 5 0 6 0 7 0 9 0 23 0 
Walbrzych 259 31 0 20 0 11 0 17 0 20 0 51 0 
Warsaw 2415 179 9 86 8 70 8 81 5 120 5 88 5 
Wloclawek 148 22 0 9 0 11 0 11 0 13 0 18 0 
Wroclaw 945 63 5 33 4 19 4 19 4 41 4 53 2 
Zabrze 190 8 2 11 1 2 1 6 1 8 1 5 1 
 
 
 
Table A3. Sample sizes — World Justice Project — the General Population Poll 
 
 q9a q9b q10a q12a q12b q12c q13a q13b q17a q18a q18b q18c 
 
Belgium_Antwerp 497 500 511 524 515 511 521 509 523 482 486 500 
 
Belgium_Charleroi 187 184 196 203 199 198 195 198 197 180 179 179 
 
Belgium_Ghent 244 239 243 255 249 249 247 249 254 233 234 239 
 
Bulgaria_Plovdiv 188 187 189 193 196 197 197 197 198 198 199 198 
 
Bulgaria_Sofia 567 550 581 594 591 593 595 593 614 605 606 605 
 
Bulgaria_Varna 186 183 188 196 195 187 198 198 197 197 197 197 
 
Croatia_Rijeka 112 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 
 
Croatia_Split 148 155 155 155 155 156 157 157 157 157 157 157 
 
Croatia_Zagreb 707 723 725 728 719 718 726 726 727 729 729 729 
 
Czech Republic_Brno 196 197 197 196 198 196 203 202 202 202 202 200 
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Czech Republic_Ostrava 175 178 176 179 181 175 181 180 181 178 178 180 
 
Czech Republic_Prague 587 586 584 594 596 595 608 602 601 595 597 599 
 
Denmark_Aarhus 293 293 293 293 293 293 293 293 293 293 293 293 
 
Denmark_Copenhagen 487 487 487 487 487 487 487 487 487 487 487 487 
 
Denmark_Odense 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 
 
Estonia_99. Other 158 157 156 162 157 160 162 158 161 143 143 151 
 
Estonia_Narva 11 11 11 10 11 11 11 11 10 11 10 11 
 
Estonia_Tallinn 521 524 525 528 525 524 530 527 534 500 493 492 
 
Estonia_Tartu 271 272 263 274 273 270 276 274 278 249 247 251 
 
Finland_Helsinki 555 555 555 555 555 555 555 555 555 555 555 555 
 
Finland_Tampere 227 227 227 227 227 227 227 227 227 227 227 227 
 
Finland_Turku 218 218 218 218 218 218 218 218 218 218 218 218 
 
France_Lyon 136 145 148 146 146 145 144 144 146 144 143 139 
 
France_Marseille 111 110 109 110 107 108 110 110 108 102 101 102 
 
France_Paris 692 696 701 699 692 695 689 692 698 662 659 658 
 
Germany_Berlin 472 472 468 477 478 481 476 483 486 464 463 455 
 
Germany_Hamburg 257 261 259 267 269 268 266 271 272 255 251 251 
 
Germany_Munich 197 195 201 199 202 198 201 204 202 194 194 193 
 
Greece_Athens 687 675 686 686 688 695 696 693 691 693 692 689 
 
Greece_Patras 101 102 102 101 102 100 102 102 102 102 101 102 
 
Greece_Salonica 194 194 195 196 196 198 197 197 197 197 196 196 
 
Hungary_Budapest 807 807 806 809 808 808 809 810 812 797 798 801 
 
Hungary_Debrecen 97 95 93 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 106 
 
Hungary_Miskolc 80 79 79 80 80 80 80 80 80 77 77 77 
 
Italy_99. Other 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
 
Italy_Milan 262 257 255 262 260 255 261 261 263 255 257 256 
 
Italy_Naples 171 167 169 173 172 169 170 171 173 172 172 172 
 
Italy_Rome 511 508 504 515 510 505 513 512 519 506 508 506 
 
Netherlands_Amsterdam 377 374 376 383 386 388 393 389 397 377 376 374 
 
Netherlands_Rotterdam 314 316 313 316 313 311 315 313 324 297 299 296 
 
Netherlands_The Hague 241 234 241 241 238 239 243 242 252 226 227 223 
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Norway_Bergen 215 205 212 224 215 214 213 217 228 214 212 208 
 
Norway_Oslo 545 525 530 546 531 543 545 549 569 535 537 521 
 
Norway_Trondheim 165 161 167 174 167 165 172 171 177 172 173 167 
 
Poland_Cracow 282 297 291 300 298 296 298 298 300 299 299 299 
 
Poland_Lodz 239 235 249 249 246 246 248 248 249 249 249 249 
 
Poland_Warsaw 434 434 441 451 444 448 451 445 447 449 449 449 
 
Portugal_Braga 111 111 111 111 111 111 111 111 111 111 111 111 
 
Portugal_Lisbon 498 498 498 498 498 498 498 498 498 498 498 498 
 
Portugal_Porto 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 
 
Romania_Bucharest 408 437 432 443 439 437 440 440 446 446 446 446 
 
Romania_Cluj-Napoca 261 277 274 282 277 279 281 281 282 282 282 282 
 
Romania_Timisoara 254 270 267 272 270 270 272 272 272 272 272 272 
 
Slovenia_Celje 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 80 80 80 80 
 
Slovenia_Ljubljana 673 673 673 673 673 673 673 673 672 659 659 662 
 
Slovenia_Maribor 246 246 246 246 246 246 246 246 246 241 242 242 
 
Spain_Barcelona 267 271 276 274 275 271 273 273 279 273 272 274 
 
Spain_Madrid 551 555 562 568 565 562 561 560 564 558 554 556 
 
Spain_Valencia 138 140 142 145 142 142 142 142 146 143 141 142 
 
Sweden_Goteborg 261 276 293 308 312 313 314 314 315 298 298 293 
 
Sweden_Malmo 161 169 182 185 184 189 186 189 193 184 187 184 
 
Sweden_Stockholm 410 415 454 453 462 464 455 462 474 452 452 448 
 
United 
Kingdom_Birmingham 
82 80 81 79 82 83 80 81 85 81 82 83 
 
United 
Kingdom_Glasgow 
67 65 67 62 65 65 66 66 66 65 65 67 
 
United 
Kingdom_London 
751 747 764 770 770 769 771 777 806 753 755 760 
 
 
 q18d q18e q36a q36b q36c q36d q36e q15a q15b q15c q15d q15e q15f 
Belgium_Antwerp 496 502 399 453 408 455 433 486 450 490 472 435 465 
Belgium_Charleroi 180 183 145 167 160 172 169 184 169 194 187 173 181 
Belgium_Ghent 239 240 197 224 197 218 221 230 223 234 232 222 228 
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Bulgaria_Plovdiv 198 196 170 180 173 189 165 189 166 192 167 162 193 
Bulgaria_Sofia 604 604 426 481 486 508 454 471 414 491 495 469 485 
Bulgaria_Varna 196 196 123 155 166 167 162 142 127 161 160 147 165 
Croatia_Rijeka 114 114 86 95 92 87 85 110 111 112 108 108 111 
Croatia_Split 157 157 116 133 127 124 119 150 149 152 149 151 152 
Croatia_Zagreb 729 729 543 625 620 574 566 707 710 718 685 688 703 
Czech Republic_Brno 196 197 176 184 185 182 181 184 183 187 182 179 182 
Czech Republic_Ostrava 178 179 152 162 167 170 168 157 148 165 169 161 154 
Czech Republic_Prague 589 599 526 544 543 547 537 536 511 557 543 538 533 
Denmark_Aarhus 293 293 293 293 293 293 293 293 293 293 293 293 293 
Denmark_Copenhagen 487 487 487 487 487 487 487 487 487 487 487 487 487 
Denmark_Odense 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 220 
Estonia_99. Other 150 147 152 156 149 145 152 142 134 139 132 128 139 
Estonia_Narva 10 11 6 9 7 9 8 11 11 10 11 11 11 
Estonia_Tallinn 479 498 433 460 437 454 458 459 410 468 431 400 457 
Estonia_Tartu 245 252 241 248 237 251 260 211 194 231 215 191 221 
Finland_Helsinki 555 555 555 555 555 555 555 555 555 555 555 555 555 
Finland_Tampere 227 227 227 227 227 227 227 227 227 227 227 227 227 
Finland_Turku 218 218 218 218 218 218 218 218 218 218 218 218 218 
France_Lyon 140 143 115 117 118 124 120 133 113 141 134 125 131 
France_Marseille 103 104 88 92 93 100 96 104 97 107 107 101 103 
France_Paris 647 662 540 568 596 615 600 661 576 669 652 622 633 
Germany_Berlin 456 460 406 443 450 457 462 432 381 427 416 409 425 
Germany_Hamburg 250 252 229 244 237 239 240 230 211 230 230 222 225 
Germany_Munich 193 192 168 183 179 181 183 182 168 185 179 174 180 
Greece_Athens 685 688 644 687 653 682 665 660 619 656 636 630 660 
Greece_Patras 102 102 102 101 95 101 101 96 96 97 93 94 96 
Greece_Salonica 197 197 188 195 188 193 193 182 174 182 176 180 184 
Hungary_Budapest 797 801 809 811 813 812 810 774 760 779 776 760 770 
Hungary_Debrecen 105 105 106 106 106 106 106 105 106 105 106 105 105 
Hungary_Miskolc 77 77 80 80 79 80 80 75 73 74 75 72 75 
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Italy_99. Other 3 3 
    
1 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Italy_Milan 255 250 213 216 223 231 231 245 236 253 250 243 244 
Italy_Naples 174 173 166 170 170 171 162 161 167 168 164 167 164 
Italy_Rome 509 502 408 436 438 435 447 494 472 501 496 486 491 
Netherlands_Amsterdam 369 375 304 347 328 339 327 358 337 368 364 334 350 
Netherlands_Rotterdam 296 301 265 290 283 289 282 297 280 307 301 285 295 
Netherlands_The Hague 222 222 194 220 205 213 210 223 198 227 217 196 218 
Norway_Bergen 214 216 187 201 202 201 204 206 188 208 201 189 194 
Norway_Oslo 529 535 449 493 499 490 491 493 443 491 486 448 472 
Norway_Trondheim 168 168 145 156 157 155 155 151 141 150 146 133 141 
Poland_Cracow 297 300 241 241 275 249 285 291 281 297 288 286 286 
Poland_Lodz 247 247 199 204 223 204 236 234 249 242 231 231 232 
Poland_Warsaw 441 448 400 415 423 404 429 429 439 441 436 421 426 
Portugal_Braga 111 111 111 111 111 111 111 111 111 111 111 111 111 
Portugal_Lisbon 498 498 498 498 498 498 498 498 498 498 498 498 498 
Portugal_Porto 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 391 
Romania_Bucharest 446 446 349 373 403 390 413 423 426 438 417 415 416 
Romania_Cluj-Napoca 282 282 210 215 266 239 270 271 273 276 267 265 265 
Romania_Timisoara 272 272 216 226 257 238 256 260 262 266 262 258 256 
Slovenia_Celje 80 80 80 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 
Slovenia_Ljubljana 659 661 669 670 671 671 673 673 673 673 673 673 673 
Slovenia_Maribor 240 242 246 246 246 246 246 246 246 246 246 246 246 
Spain_Barcelona 268 270 220 243 231 238 240 267 265 272 272 266 269 
Spain_Madrid 549 549 464 495 484 502 497 547 539 557 557 541 547 
Spain_Valencia 138 137 121 132 128 130 129 142 133 140 141 140 141 
Sweden_Goteborg 294 293 277 290 288 297 292 257 216 275 263 258 269 
Sweden_Malmo 181 183 167 175 174 172 173 161 133 161 158 157 162 
Sweden_Stockholm 434 447 419 437 428 445 434 405 323 405 398 382 382 
United 
Kingdom_Birmingham 
81 81 81 84 84 85 85 78 76 79 79 75 79 
United 61 67 57 60 57 63 61 58 57 62 63 60 64 
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Kingdom_Glasgow 
United 
Kingdom_London 
737 755 696 739 717 746 744 716 642 728 717 659 704 
 
Table A4. Test of homogeneity of variance and the Welch test  
Variables 
Test of Homogeneity of Variances Robust Tests of Equality of Means — Welch test 
Levene 
Statistic 
df1 df2 Sig. Statistica df1 df2 Sig. 
ILE_I .319 3 54 .812 53.744 3 22.856 .000 
ILE_C 15.594 3 54 .000 12.999 3 21.908 .000 
GT 5.368 3 54 .003 42.667 3 23.329 .000 
IIT2 .351 3 54 .788 127.510 3 25.778 .000 
IC 1.438 3 54 .242 124.075 3 23.115 .000 
IPB 19.002 3 54 .000 79.528 3 22.834 .000 
ILG 2.042 3 54 .119 9.979 3 23.412 .000 
a. Asymptotically F distributed. 
 
 
 
Table A5. Multiple comparisons by the Games-Howell test 
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ILE_I  
1 
2 –.26263* .03364 .000 –.3666 –.1586 
3 –.35507* .03523 .000 –.4610 –.2491 
4 –.11779* .03473 .027 –.2228 –.0127 
2 
1 .26263* .03364 .000 .1586 .3666 
3 –.09244* .02095 .001 –.1501 –.0348 
4 .14485* .02011 .000 .0905 .1992 
3 
1 .35507* .03523 .000 .2491 .4610 
2 .09244* .02095 .001 .0348 .1501 
4 .23729* .02266 .000 .1757 .2989 
4 
1 .11779* .03473 .027 .0127 .2228 
2 –.14485* .02011 .000 –.1992 –.0905 
3 –.23729* .02266 .000 –.2989 –.1757 
ILE_C  
1 
2 –.05038 .05678 .812 –.2361 .1354 
3 –.11725 .05686 .249 –.3030 .0685 
4 –.11839 .05699 .244 –.3041 .0674 
2 
1 .05038 .05678 .812 –.1354 .2361 
3 –.06687* .01247 .000 –.1010 –.0327 
4 –.06801* .01301 .000 –.1031 –.0329 
3 
1 .11725 .05686 .249 –.0685 .3030 
2 .06687* .01247 .000 .0327 .1010 
4 –.00114 .01336 1.000 –.0373 .0350 
4 
1 .11839 .05699 .244 –.0674 .3041 
2 .06801* .01301 .000 .0329 .1031 
3 .00114 .01336 1.000 –.0350 .0373 
GT 
1 
2 .00770 .03251 .995 –.0868 .1022 
3 –.20586* .02873 .000 –.2947 –.1170 
4 –.06236 .03440 .302 –.1602 .0355 
2 
1 –.00770 .03251 .995 –.1022 .0868 
3 –.21356* .02169 .000 –.2737 –.1534 
4 –.07006 .02878 .090 –.1478 .0077 
3 
1 .20586* .02873 .000 .1170 .2947 
2 .21356* .02169 .000 .1534 .2737 
4 .14350* .02443 .000 .0769 .2101 
4 
1 .06236 .03440 .302 –.0355 .1602 
2 .07006 .02878 .090 –.0077 .1478 
3 –.14350* .02443 .000 –.2101 –.0769 
IIT2  
1 
2 –.26137* .02107 .000 –.3207 –.2020 
3 –.45593* .02327 .000 –.5212 –.3907 
4 –.18721* .02025 .000 –.2441 –.1303 
2 1 .26137* .02107 .000 .2020 .3207 
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3 –.19456* .02327 .000 –.2584 –.1307 
4 .07415* .02025 .005 .0193 .1290 
3 
1 .45593* .02327 .000 .3907 .5212 
2 .19456* .02327 .000 .1307 .2584 
4 .26871* .02253 .000 .2070 .3304 
4 
1 .18721* .02025 .000 .1303 .2441 
2 –.07415* .02025 .005 –.1290 –.0193 
3 –.26871* .02253 .000 –.3304 –.2070 
IC  
1 
2 .39578* .03153 .000 .3025 .4891 
3 .48032* .02895 .000 .3904 .5703 
4 .20996* .03159 .000 .1168 .3031 
2 
1 –.39578* .03153 .000 –.4891 –.3025 
3 .08454* .01949 .001 .0307 .1384 
4 –.18582* .02323 .000 –.2487 –.1230 
3 
1 –.48032* .02895 .000 –.5703 –.3904 
2 –.08454* .01949 .001 –.1384 –.0307 
4 –.27036* .01960 .000 –.3235 –.2172 
4 
1 –.20996* .03159 .000 –.3031 –.1168 
2 .18582* .02323 .000 .1230 .2487 
3 .27036* .01960 .000 .2172 .3235 
IB  
1 
2 .33035* .02237 .000 .2608 .3999 
3 .32032* .02186 .000 .2511 .3895 
4 .16737* .03513 .000 .0710 .2638 
2 
1 –.33035* .02237 .000 –.3999 –.2608 
3 –.01003 .01047 .774 –.0387 .0187 
4 –.16298* .02942 .000 –.2443 –.0816 
3 
1 –.32032* .02186 .000 –.3895 –.2511 
2 .01003 .01047 .774 –.0187 .0387 
4 –.15295* .02904 .000 –.2335 –.0724 
4 
1 –.16737* .03513 .000 –.2638 –.0710 
2 .16298* .02942 .000 .0816 .2443 
3 .15295* .02904 .000 .0724 .2335 
ILG  
1 
2 –.13333* .03069 .005 –.2257 –.0410 
3 –.20321* .04487 .001 –.3288 –.0776 
4 –.05714 .03412 .369 –.1550 .0407 
2 
1 .13333* .03069 .005 .0410 .2257 
3 –.06988 .03848 .300 –.1792 .0394 
4 .07619* .02512 .023 .0082 .1442 
3 
1 .20321* .04487 .001 .0776 .3288 
2 .06988 .03848 .300 –.0394 .1792 
4 .14607* .04126 .009 .0313 .2608 
4 
1 .05714 .03412 .369 –.0407 .1550 
2 –.07619* .02512 .023 –.1442 –.0082 
3 –.14607* .04126 .009 –.2608 –.0313 
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. 
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